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CASTE, CLASS, AND EQUAL CITIZENSlllP 
William E. Forbath* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a familiar egalitarian constitutional tradition and another 
we have largely forgotten. The familiar one springs from Brown v. 
Board of Education;1 its roots lie in the Reconstruction era. Court­
centered and countermajoritarian, it takes aim at caste and racial subor­
dination. The forgotten one also originated with Reconstruction, but it 
was a majoritarian tradition, addressing its arguments to lawmakers and 
citizens, not to courts. Aimed against harsh class inequalities, it cen­
tered on decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of 
economic independence and democracy. Borrowing a phrase from its 
Progressive Era proponents, I will call it the social citizenship tradition.2 
My thesis is that the seemingly separate fates and flaws of these two 
egalitarian constitutional outlooks are joined. By retrieving the history 
of the social citizenship tradition and its buried links to the court-
* Angus Wynne, Sr. Professor of Civil Jurisprudence, Professor of History, University of 
Texas at Austin. - Ed. This Article is for Joel Handler and Kenneth Karst, for their friend­
ship and inspiration. Thanks also go to David Abraham, Bruce Ackerman, Alex Aleinikoff, 
Joyce Appleby, Craig Becker, Gyora Binder, Eileen Boris, David Brody, Josh Cohen, 
Nancy Cott, Micheal Kent Curtis, Ellen DuBois, Cindy Estlund, Eric Foner, Jack Getman, 
Robert Goldstein, Dirk Hartog, Sam Issacharoff, Linda Kerber, Sandy Levinson, Gillian 
Lester, Doug Laycock, Nelson Lichtenstein, Frank Michelman, Neil Netanel, Gunther 
Peck, Jim Pope, Robert Post, David Rabban, Jim Sidbury, Reva Siegel, Amy Stanley, 
Christopher Tomlins, Gerald Torres, and to participants at the American University, 
Washington College of Law Faculty Colloquium; University of Chicago Legal History 
Workshop; the NYU Legal History Colloquium; the Ohio State University College of Law 
Faculty Colloquium; the University of Pennsylvania Law School Faculty Workshop; the 
UT-Austin School of Law Faculty Colloquium; the UT-Austin History Department Brown 
Bag Lunch; and the Yale Law School Legal History Workshop. Nate Blakeslee, Leilah 
Danielson, Bill Niemi, Lee Thompson and Todd Vogel provided outstanding research assis­
tance. The Michigan Law Review provided outstanding editorial assistance. Finally, I am 
grateful to the many new colleagues and friends who have niade UT-Austin School of Law 
a wonderfully supportive and engaging place. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 See, e.g., FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION (1905). 
Today, we associate the term "social citizenship" most readily with the English sociologist 
T.H. Marshall and his classic lectures on the rise of the welfare state as a new "stage" in the 
development of citizenship. See T.H. MARSHALL, CmzENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1949). 
Thoughtful recent assessments of Marshall from a U.S. perspective include Nancy F. Cott, 
Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 
1440, 1448-50 (1998); Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, Contract Versus Charity: Why ls 
There No Social Citizenship in the United States?, 22 SOCIALIST REV. 45 (1992). This Arti­
cle approaches Fraser and Gordon's question quite differently. 
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centered ideal of the Constitution as safeguard of "discrete and insular 
minorities," I hope to deepen and change our understanding of liberal 
constitutionalism and its discontents today. 
I begin with a present impasse in liberal constitutional theory and 
practice. Since the late 1960s and early '70s, leading liberal constitu­
tional law scholars have held that the Fourteenth Amendment embod­
ies an anticaste or equal citizenship principle, which requires more than 
mere legal equality. It allows and in many circumstances demands 
broad-gauged affirmative action for blacks and other minorities and it 
requires constitutional welfare rights for the very poor, again conceived 
as a racially stigmatized minority. The scholars have produced a pro­
gram of constitutionally compelled changes no constitutional court 
could enact, but they point out that the reach of constitutional norms 
like equal protection may extend well beyond the capacities of the 
courts. Still, these norms must bind the nation's lawmakers and citi­
zenry. The liberal theorists tum to history, and remind us that our un­
derstanding of the Constitution will always be partial if we attend only 
to case law; we must study with equal care what the Constitution has 
meant in democratic arenas. But, as we'll see, when they shifted their 
particular program of rights and remedies to the democratic arena, 
these theorists did not consider how deeply its substance was molded by 
the institutional ideal of the Court as the countermajoritarian guardian 
of "discrete and insular minorities." Today, in Congress and other are­
nas, broad-gauged affirmative action and nationally guaranteed welfare 
rights are being assailed and abandoned, and the liberal scholars seem 
increasingly ambivalent about defending them as constitutional impera­
tives. Even to their constitutional champions, affirmative action and 
welfare rights have come to seem partial, inadequate embodiments of 
the equal citizenship principle they are meant to secure. Yet the schol­
ars have no better view of what it requires. 
When one arrives at such an impasse, it is useful to reconsider one's 
point of departure. The starting point in this case was constitutional 
common sense: it was the outlook of Brown. The solution to racial sub­
ordination in the United States lies in extending equal citizenship to 
those excluded from it because of skin color. The road remains strewn 
with obstacles, but the direction is clear: it runs through our creed of 
equal rights. But consider a different starting point; instead of a solu­
tion, it points to another problem. America, according to this second 
perspective, will never overcome racial subordination until the nation 
confronts its deep class divisions; and it cannot redress its class divisions 
effectively without addressing its racial cleavages. 
Call this idea the historical knot of race and class. Historians and 
political analysts have understood much of our past in these terms, from 
the Revolution of 1776 to the revolt of the Reagan Democrats. Black 
slavery, in this view, not only financed the American Revolution; by 
keeping the propertyless laboring class in chains, it also enabled the co-
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lonial gentry to forge a revolutionary "equal rights" outlook and repub­
lican political culture among all ranks of white colonists, freed from the 
threat of social revolution.3 Thereafter, black subordination remained a 
potent element of American national identity, binding white Americans 
together as "equals" across the unacknowledged breaches of class. 
Of course, the Reconstruction amendments extended equal rights to 
blacks. This prompted Gunnar Myrdal, on the eve of Brown v. Board, 
to observe that "in principle, the Negro problem was solved long ago."4 
It only remained to put the solution into practice. But if black subordi­
nation has been more than an aberration from the equal rights creed, if 
it also has proved part of the cultural and socioeconomic groundwork of 
that creed, then matters might be even more intractable than Myrdal 
anticipated. In that case, attaining equal citizenship for black America 
would require altering the meaning of that principle for white America. 
The equal rights creed could go only so far in undoing the subordination 
of black Americans, unless it also contends with the ways that severe 
class inequalities mock equal citizenship for all. Yet, contemporary lib­
eral "rights talk" addresses the injuries of caste for black and other 
nonwhite Americans but not the overlapping injuries of class many of 
them share with many whites. 
That may be so, colleagues in the liberal precincts of constitutional 
scholarship may respond, but class inequalities lie outside our jurisdic­
tion. True, the meaning of our constitutional tradition is forever de­
bated, but everyone seems to agree that redressing class inequalities has 
not been part of the debate. Insights about race and class have ap­
proached this terrain from without. They have informed important cri­
tiques of our constitutional norms and culture.5 But they have not 
guided interpretations, because all our stories tell us that the Constitu­
tion's promise of equal citizenship addresses racial and caste inequalities 
but leaves class inequalities alone. No widely shared reading of the 
Constitution has ever run to the contrary. 
Here the liberal constitutionalists are mistaken. They overlook the 
social citizenship tradition and its distinguished career in the 
constitutional history they claim to describe. By applying their own new 
precept - looking carefully at how the Constitution has been 
interpreted outside the courts in more democratic arenas - Part II 
shows that ours is not the first era in which reform-minded 
3. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL 
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975). 
4. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 11 (1944). 
5. See especially DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); and Alan Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme 
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
4 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1 
constitutional thinkers have discerned a notable "gap between the reach 
of constitutional case law and the reach of the Constitution" in respect 
of "economic justice."6 But when one actually examines what reformers 
thought the Constitution meant in respect of economic justice during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, one finds a conception 
of the affirmative dimensions of equal citizenship very different from 
that of today's constitutional liberals. 
The social citizenship tradition was neither uniform nor unchanging. 
Over time and across social groups, its exponents differed widely about 
how government ought to vouchsafe social and economic citizenship, 
and about who belonged to the community of full citizens. But all these 
reform-minded constitutional actors - agrarian Populists, labor and 
trade union advocates, middle-class Progressives, as well as the profes­
sionals, politicians, and lawmakers who embraced and sought to harness 
these social movements - agreed that the guarantee of equal citizen­
ship entailed decent work, a measure of economic autonomy and de­
mocracy, and social provision for "all Americans." 
We remember the restraints these generations of reformers de­
manded of the judiciary and forget the affirmative obligations their con­
stitutional outlook laid on the other branches of govemment.7 Constitu­
tional law scholars and historians alike have assumed that late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformers shared Justice 
Holmes's view that the Fourteenth Amendment, rightly understood, 
enacted no "economic theory" - as far as possible, constitutional dis­
course ought to be divorced from political economy.8 In fact, as I will 
show in Part II, the great reform movements of those decades sought no 
such divorce. Rather, they sought to replace the Court with elected 
lawmakers in the role of the nation's "authoritative" constitutional po-
6. Lawrence Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitu­
tional Law, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 410, 419 (1993). 
7. Perhaps our leading legal historian, Morton Horwitz, recently has made the impor­
tant point that "democracy" appeared "suddenly" as a "foundational concept" in constitu­
tional discourse during the later New Deal. But the New Deal concept of constitutional 
democracy was a lamentably "narrow" and impoverished one in Honvitz's view; its core 
meaning was merely judicial restraint and majority rule. A bludgeon for beating Lochner­
ism, it induced "paralysis" and hostility toward Warren Court activism among many leading 
jurists and legal academics. See Morton Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Fore­
word: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 
HARV. L. REv. 32, 61-63 (1993). New to doctrine, the concept of constitutional democracy 
Horwitz describes was not new to constitutional discourse outside the courts, and its central 
meaning was neither majority rule nor judicial restraint. For New Dealers, as for their 
forebears in this tradition of discourse, this Article shows, the key idea was that constitu­
tional democracy in an industrial society entailed a redefinition of the rights of citizenship, 
and a corollary expansion of the domain and duties of national government. Judicial re­
straint was a means to this end, and majority rule was not constitutionally sufficient without 
these new rights and duties. 
8. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] constitu­
tion is not intended to embody a particular economic theory ... . "). 
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litical economist.9 While Holmes held that the Constitution allowed 
broad reforms, the reform movements claimed that it required them, or 
that it ought to do so. The Lochner majority found an antiredistributive 
norm in the Constitution; the reformers identified a distributive one. 
From Reconstruction through the New Deal, they insisted that the po­
litical economy was shot through with constitutional infirmities that the 
nation was obliged to mend. 
Until the 1930s, this was chiefly an oppositionist tradition. It had 
scored some important but limited victories in state legislatures, state 
judiciaries, and even Congress. But the official constitutional order 
condemned many of the rights and remedies that the reformers' Consti­
tution demanded. With the New Deal, this protracted crisis came to a 
head. Part ID shows how the social citizenship tradition provided FDR 
and the New Dealers with not only a rights rhetoric but a constitutional 
narrative, arguments, modes of interpretation, and conceptions of the 
allocation of interpretive authority that supported their "constitutional 
revolution." But then, of course, Part III must answer the question: If 
the constitutional principles of social citizenship prevailed, why have we 
forgotten them? 
Answering this question requires joining forces, but also taking issue 
\vith, Bruce Ackerman's famous account of the New Deal 
"revolution."10 Part ID outlines a more complex and more deeply 
historical understanding of the New Deal "constitutional moment" -
and its relationship to the Reconstruction "moment" - than that found 
in Ackerman's important work. Like Ackerman, I am centrally 
interested in the ways that citizens, social movements, politicians, 
lawmakers, Presidents, and other nonjudicial state actors have tried to 
validate understandings of the rights of citizens and the powers and 
duties of government divergent from or opposed to the courts'. But on 
my reading, the history of these "moments" is too jagged and 
contradictory to support Ackerman's narrative of non-Article V 
amendments. 
The recently enacted Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu­
nity Reconciliation Act, ending the federal guarantee of welfare to eli­
gible parents and children,11 provides a case in point. Did the New Deal 
enact a non-Article V amendment guaranteeing a federal constitutional 
right to welfare? If so, one might question the constitutionality of the 
9. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924). 
10. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE Tiffi PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-130 (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE Tiffi PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255-
278 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Law­
making, in REsPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 63 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking]. 
11. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat) 2105. 
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recent law. The Court may not be interested, but the conscientious leg­
islator and citizen might like to know.12 
Ackerman is unable to tell them. He defines constitutional mo­
ments as occasions for revising our "fundamental commitments,"13 and 
arriving anew at considered popular judgments on "the rights of citizens 
and the permanent interests of the community."14 How, then, did the 
New Deal moment redefine these rights and commitments? It gained 
"constitutional legitimation" for the national welfare state.15 But did it 
require it - by producing a redefinition of national citizenship? 
Throughout his long and detailed discussions of the New Deal moment, 
Ackerman studiously avoids the question, remaining silent and seem­
ingly uncertain about this central issue. 
The New Dealers' robust conception of social citizenship goes 
unmentioned and unanalyzed by Ackerman, although by his own 
method, it defined the New Deal's "constitutional mandate." The 
reason, I think, lies in the gulf that separates this new conception of 
citizenship rights and the more partial patchwork of entitlements that 
constituted the New Deal's actual legacy. The mandate embraced a 
universal right to decent work and social provision; the enactments 
included neither. There is a gap between the "mandate" and the 
outcome of the New Deal "moment" which Ackerman's narrative 
cannot explain. 
A more sober look at our constitutional moments supplies an expla­
nation. Between the constitutional mandate and its enactment fell the 
shadow of Jim Crow and the betrayal of Reconstruction. Bills institut­
ing social citizenship enjoyed broad support in Congress. Southern 
Dixiecrats held the balance of power, however, and thwarted the meas­
ures. As a consequence, the New Deal constitutional legacy that is un­
der attack today is a partial one. We have enshrined the vast expansion 
of national governmental power, but not what it was expanded for. 
White America's and the federal government's ongoing abandonment 
of Reconstruction did more than deprive black Americans of civil and 
political rights for almost another century. By allowing the emergence 
and consolidation of the Solid South, this same constitutional bad faith 
also operated in the New Deal era to prevent all Americans from se­
curing the boon of social citizenship. Waged to secure those social and 
economic rights, the New Deal constitutional revolution was left incom­
plete because of white America's betrayal of an earlier revolution and 
its promise of equal citizenship for blacks. 
12. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). 
13. Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, supra note 10, at 64. 
14. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 231, 235. 
15. Jd. at 43. 
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Part IV concludes the Article by examining the civil rights era from 
this perspective. It shows that civil rights leaders and Great Society 
policymakers foresaw the dilemmas bedeviling today's liberals. The 
equal rights creed could go but so far in undoing the subordination of 
black Americans, unless it also contended with the ways that severe 
class inequalities mock equal citizenship for all. Without social citizen­
ship for all Americans, the leaders and policy makers recognized, nei­
ther antidiscrimination laws nor affirmative action would enable a great 
many black Americans to escape second-class citizenship. Essential but 
insufficient by itself, affirmative action would prompt racial backlash, 
black leaders like King and Rustin prophesied, and still not bring equal­
ity for many poor blacks. This drove black leaders and their allies in the 
Johnson administration to try to rekindle Roosevelt's "second Bill of 
Rights" and the New Deal reform vision of decent work and livelihoods 
for all Americans, but the institutional inheritances of the New Deal it­
self, in its successes and its failures, prevented them. 
In constitutional history, as in great Southern novels, the past is 
never past. The tangled knot of race and class lies unexamined at the 
heart of this history. This has prevented scholars from fully under­
standing the embattled constitutional legacies of the New Deal and civil 
rights eras. Retrieving this history reveals no truer twentieth-century 
constitutional "moment" for courts to preserve against ordinary politics, 
but instead a recurrent constitutional conflict that was concluded by 
force and fraud, and deserves to be reopened. 
I. CASTE, CLASS, AND THE CONTOURS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
A. The "Substance of Equal Protection "  
The leading liberal constitutional scholars of the 1970s sought to de­
termine the "substance of equal protection," as they set out to unfold 
the full implications of the "egalitarian revolution" launched by the 
Warren Court.16 Here is a ruthlessly condensed account of their think­
ing, what William James might have called their shared way of "feeling 
the whole push" of constitutional development.17 
The heart of the Court's "egalitarian revolution" was the determina­
tion to give social meaning to the simpler and narrower idea of citizen­
ship as a formal legal and political status. The substantive core of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had become, in Kenneth Karst's words, a 
"principle of equal citizenship," guaranteeing "the right to be treated by 
the organized society as a respected, responsible participating mem-
16. See Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
17. WILLIAMJAMES,APLURAUSTICUNIVERSE14 (1977). 
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ber."18 Stated negatively, the principle forbade "the organized society 
to treat an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent 
caste or as a nonparticipant."19 Or, as Owen Fiss argued, the Equal Pro­
tection Clause embodied a "group-disadvantaging principle" entailing a 
"redistributive strategy" aimed "against caste" or the existence of any 
"perpetual underclass."20 Frank Michelman, too, emphasized the dis­
tributive dimensions of the guarantee of equal citizenship. As Rawls 
did, he cast these in terms of "equal respect" and "self-respect" - as 
necessarily social goods, which required "minimum welfare" to shield 
against the "stigma" and "social debilitation" of poverty.21 
The "prototype" but "not the only group" which bore the stigma 
and burdens of caste was black America.22 The remedial agenda lay in 
upholding, and often requiring, broad-gauged, race-based affirmative 
action in employment and education, and mandating minimum welfare 
rights for the very poor, conceived as a racially identified and stigma­
tized minority.23 We will return to the toils of affirmative action. Now 
18. Karst, supra note 16, at 4. 
19. Id., at 6. 
20. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PmL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-
170 {1976). 
21. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting 
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 {1969) [hereinafter 
Michelman, On Protecting the Poor]; Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Wei· 
fare Rights, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973). 
Other works similarly calling for constitutional welfare entitlements include: Akhil 
Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 37 {1990); Charles Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitu· 
tional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 {1986); Peter B. Edelman, The Next 
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); 
Thomas Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 
STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976); Kennetlt Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & 
MARYL. REv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality]; Laurence 
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to 
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); and Robin West, Toward an 
Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV.111 (1991). 
22. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 155. 
23. The text may be ambiguous. I do not mean that these theorists assumed that most 
of tlte nation's poor were black; to tlte contrary, they all note tltat the majority were (and 
are) white. Yet, tltey contended (and, as must be apparent, I agree), the stigma affiicting 
tlte poor in tlte U.S. remains bound up witlt the legacy of racial slavery. Not only poor 
blacks but poor whites suffer degradation and exclusion - and a lack of adequate social 
provision - not only by dint of the work ethic and their supposed flaunting of it, but also 
because of tlte dominant culture's historical and ongoing associations of dependency and 
unwortltiness with tlte black minority. 
That seems a fair rendering of arguments running through such works as Fiss, supra 
note 20; Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 21; Karst, supra note 16; and 
Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 
[hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights]. Also running through these works, especially 
Michelman's essays influenced by Rawls, is tlte more general claim that minimum welfare 
entitlements are essential to equal respect independently of America's racial history. See 
Michelman, On Protecting the Poor, supra note 21. 
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let's consider the constitutional right to welfare. 
As they championed this right, the scholars were greeted by a hail of 
criticism over the limits of judicial competence and the danger of 
squandering the courts' institutional legitimacy.24 In varying measures, 
they conceded some ground to the conservative critics. By 1979, for ex­
ample, Michelman acknowledged that defining the constitutional right 
to welfare was an "inappropriate" task for the judiciary and tapered the 
courts' role to one of monitoring and safeguarding legislatively enacted 
programs through statutory interpretation and "constitutional doctrines 
such as irrational classification. "25 Then the liberals hitched their redis­
tributive rights and remedies to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment and to Lawrence Sager's simple but powerful notion of "underen­
forced" constitutional norms.26 Writing in 1978, Sager lent a theoretical 
gloss to the liberals' necessary rejection of the commonplace view that 
the legal scope of a constitutional norm is "coterminous with the scope 
of its federal judicial enforcement. "27 Often, he pointed out, courts de­
cline to uphold constitutional claims because of "institutional" concerns 
such as federalism and judicial competence.28 In such instances, Sager 
argued, the norms are nevertheless valid and enforceable "to their full 
conceptual limits" in the hands of other governmental actors.29 "The 
most direct consequence of adopting this revised view is the perception 
that government officials have a legal obligation to obey" such norms to 
their "full dimensions," and a corresponding obligation to "fashion their 
own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct" accord­
ingly.30 Thus, Sager lamented that after Maher v. Roe,31 Congress 
ceased its discussion of the constitutionality of federal legislation to 
24. A sampling of conservative criticism would have to include Robert Bork, The Im­
possibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. L. Q. 695, and Ralph 
Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. Cr. REV. 
41. 
25. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 23, at 660-65, 679-80. 
26. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
27. Id. at 1213. 
28. Id. at 1217-18. 
29. Id. at 1221. Even if it were "unconventional today," Sager observed, the idea en­
joyed "a venerable provenance." Sager pointed out that in James Bradley Thayer's cele­
brated essay, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, Thayer 
"saw the Constitution as broad and binding in its breadth on governmental actors and saw 
the reasons for restraint in the application of constitutional principles as speaking only to 
the question of judicial enforcement." Sager, supra note 6, at 413 (citing James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (1893)). For a revealing historical treatment of Thayer's essay, see SYLVIA 
SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 189-94 (1990). 
30. Sager, supra note 26, at 1227. 
31. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that state regulations denying Medicaid funds for non­
therapeutic abortions did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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deny Medicaid benefits for most abortions.32 The Court's conception of 
the reach of the relevant norms ought not to have concluded the matter 
for "conscientious legislators."33 Over the next several years, other 
scholars joined Sager in concentrating scholarly attention on the "gap 
between the reach of constitutional case law and the reach of the Con­
stitution" - above all, with respect to "adequate food, shelter, health 
care, and education."34 
Most prominent is Cass Sunstein, whose Partial Constitution relies 
chiefly on Madison and the Framers' generation to remind readers that 
the Constitution was neither designed only for the courts to interpret, 
nor does it "mean only what the judges say it means."35 Ours is a "par­
tial" understanding of the Constitution because we enshrine the Court's 
interpretations and slight - or even fail to develop - others. Yet, 
other governmental actors, legislators in particular, are far better 
equipped in terms of both democratic legitimacy and institutional ca­
pacities to interpret and apply the positive entitlements entailed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Sunstein enthusiastically hands over the task of interpreting and ap­
plying the "positive rights" embodied in the "anticaste" and "freedom 
from desperate conditions" principles to the legislative and executive 
branches. Judicial recognition of these rights would only "preempt" 
"deliberative democracy" and "democratic efforts" to secure them.36 
Sunstein's is among the boldest calls for a shift of constitutional theo­
rizing away from the courts toward other actors, institutions, and 
"democratic arenas generally."37 Firmly opposed to judicial recognition 
of these rights, he never reflects on how deeply his welfare entitlements 
view of constitutional equality was shaped by an understanding that the 
judiciary would be its guarantor. Yet, those who originally fashioned 
this view, like Michelman and Karst, tailored it to comport with a doc­
trinal vision of the constitutional court as countermajoritarian guardian 
32. See Sager, supra note 26, at 1227-28 n.48. 
33. The phrase is Paul Brest's who reaches conclusions similar to Sager's. See Brest, su­
pra note 12. 
34. Sager, supra note 6, at 419. For example, Robin West, like Sager, addresses the dis­
tinction between the "adjudicated" and the "full Constitution," id. at 435, or what she calls 
the "aspirational Constitution." See Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. 
L. REV. 241 (1993). But whereas Sager and the others prize some creative or prophetic role 
for the courts, West's model of adjudicative versus legislative justice casts the judiciary, 
rather as Ackerman does, in a conservative part. Adjudicative justice, she claims, is purely 
preservationist. Courts "look to the past" for authoritative guidance, and this disables them 
from changing the status quo; Congress can (somehow) interpret the Constitution with a 
purely forward looking gaze. See id. at 261-64. 
35. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE p ARTIAL CONSTITIJTION at v-vi (1993). 
36. See id. at v-vi, 9-10, 138-40, 147-49, 338-46. 
37. See id. at 10; see also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) 
(arguing that a conception of both legislative politics and constitutional adjudications in 
dialogue with each other may lead to a greater judicial protection of individual rights). 
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of the rights of "discrete and insular minorities.ms 
In the name of democracy, Sunstein argues for stripping this still­
unrecognized minority right of any claim to judicial recognition. Al­
though the original architects have joined him, reluctantly, in relegating 
the right to the tender mercies of majoritarian politics, none of them 
save Karst has reconsidered the contours of the right itself.39 They con­
tinue to link it with discrete and insular minorities. Unconstrained by 
the problems of judicial competence or the countermajoritarian diffi­
culty, they might consider viewing it as but part of a broader under­
standing of the distributive and enabling dimensions of the equal citi­
zenship principle. 
Again, the recently enacted Personal Responsibility and Work Op­
portunity Reconciliation Act,40 ending the federal guarantee of welfare 
to eligible parents and children, is relevant. Racial animus contributed 
to passage of this legislation. But the Act carried other cultural freight 
as well. The very title of the new law encapsulates a widely shared, if 
largely misplaced, moral criticism of the idea of a right to welfare.41 The 
liberals must address this claim on its merits, not least because their own 
arguments on behalf of the constitutional status of the right to welfare 
point to the idea of "Personal Responsibility" and through it to a right 
to "Work Opportunity" and a decent livelihood.42 
38. See Karst, supra note 16, at 19-24; Michelman, On Protecting the Poor, supra note 
21. 
39. See infra note 42 (discussing Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Con­
stitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997) [hereafter Karst, The Coming Crisis 
of Work]). 
40. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat) 2105. 
41. The criticism is misplaced insofar as all the empirical studies suggest that a signifi­
cant number of welfare recipients are also working for pay to make ends meet. See JOEL 
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND 
WELFARE 11-12 (1997); Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Welfare, in CHRISTOPHER 
JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 204 (Harper Collins 1993) (1992) (describing in-depth 
study of welfare recipients in Chicago). 
42. I briefly set out the central normative and policy arguments for congressional 
recognition of a constitutional right to decent work in William E. Forbath, Why Is This 
Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the 
Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1790-1804 (1994) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSIEIN, THE 
PARTIAL C0NSTI1UTION (1993)). 
In a powerful recent essay, Kenneth Karst arrives at similar conclusions, bringing his 
great insight and wisdom to the case. See Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work, supra note 39. 
Already in his pioneering Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 
16, Karst suggested that chronic unemployment in the black inner city trenched on the 
equal citizenship principle, and he returned briefly to this theme in later work, see 
KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989); Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 21. In this es­
say, he directly addresses the many-sided constitutional significance of decent work oppor­
tunities for all. What he calls "the coming crisis of work" the mounting "shortage of decent 
jobs in America" and the increasingly "split society" it has produced prompt Karst to con­
clude that Congressional recognition of a constitutional "right of access to work" is essen-
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Recall Michelman's lodestone of "equal respect" and Karst's defini­
tion of the equal citizenship principle - "the right to be treated by the 
organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating mem­
ber."43 "To be a citizen," Karst wrote in 1977, "is not merely to be a 
consumer of rights, but to be responsible to other members of the com­
munity."44 Among these responsibilities, the citizen must "takeO care of 
himself and his family."45 This view of responsibility, in turn, "implies a 
claim to respect, which the individual can legitimately make against the 
society."46 Michelman, for his part, rests the right to welfare on the 
ground that that right secures for each of us the "marks of minimum so­
cial respect" upon which one's equal standing in the life of the commu­
nity depends.47 
Yet only with difficulty can one picture a constitutional right to wel­
fare doing the social work assigned to it. Only in a truncated sense can a 
welfare check, however generous, enable one to "take care of' - in the 
sense of assuming "responsibility" for - oneself and one's family.48 To 
receive a welfare check even as of right is to remain "a consumer of 
rights." To be enabled to "make a claim to respect" by dint of meeting 
one's common responsibilities demands an enabling right to decent 
work. The theorists' own reasoning, no less than the welfare reform 
rhetoric, suggests that the "substance of equal protection" and the social 
meaning of equal citizenship must include the opportunity to earn a 
livelihood that enables one to contribute to supporting oneself and 
one's family in a minimally decent fashion. 
The more the liberal theorists have turned to history to support con­
stitutional welfare rights, the more apparent this gap between rights and 
reasoning has become. In 1987, in the thick of the republican revival, 
Michelman brilliantly seized hold of the "Founders" venerable republi­
can conviction that "security of property holdings" was not just a matter 
of private self-interest; it was of general political concern. Material in-
ti al. 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21. 
44. Karst, supra note 16, at 9. 
45. Id. at 10. 
46.Jd. 
47. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 23, at 680. 
48. Aid for Families with Dependent Children, the federal entitlement program which 
the recent welfare reforms eliminated, was conceived as enabling single mothers of small 
children to take care of those children. But the Aid was never viewed as earned compensa­
tion which organized society paid such mothers in exchange for assuming this socially nec­
essary responsibility. It was seen as substitute state largesse for the earnings of the absent 
male breadwinner, until it became viewed as state largesse that freed welfare mothers from 
the responsibility of supporting themselves and their children like "the rest of us." See gen· 
erally JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM (1995); THEDA SKOCPOL, 
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MonmRS: THE PoLmCAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN nm 
UNITED STATES (1992). 
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dependence and security, "a secure base of material support," was 
viewed as indispensable if one's "independence and competence as a 
participant in public affairs was to be guaranteed. "49 On one reading, 
this republican maxim simply joins the related liberal individualist ra­
tionales for the antiredistributive, property-protecting provisions and 
designs in the founders' Constitution. On another reading, however, 
the republican maxim holds out a "distributive" as well as an antiredis­
tributive imperative, and this second reading finds support in the "inclu­
sionary messages in the Founders' republican rhetoric."50 Where, then, 
are the distributive provisions and architecture in the founders' Consti­
tution? They were deferred. The "prospect of westward territorial ex­
pansion" meant that as long as there would be "land to appropriate, one 
could imagine a freehold beneath every household ... supporting the 
freeholder's independence."51 As long as this state of affairs continued, 
the Constitution's protection of private property - i.e., its possessive or 
antiredistributive regard for property - was sufficient; the democratic­
republican "problem of property distribution" could be "postpone[ d]."52 
Today, the problem can be postponed no longer, and our centuries-old 
democratic-republican ''commitments . . .  argue for the recognition of a 
constitutional status for distributive concerns about property." That is, 
they demand "constitutional legalization of welfare claims."53 
Sunstein also enlists the Founders behind constitutional welfare 
claims. Unlike Michelman, his argument involves no intricate dialectic. 
Indeed, the point is barely argued. Citing some of Madison's and Jef­
ferson's best-known expressions of concern for maintaining a broad dis­
tribution of productive property among white male citizens, Sunstein 
simply states that the two "enthusiastically endorsed" the idea of consti­
tutional welfare rights. 54 
Let us put to one side the oft-noted normative problems with efforts 
to revive the republicanism of a Jefferson or Madison as a guide for con­
temporary questions of distributive justice - in particular, the second­
and third-class status in their republican political-economic vision of 
women, slaves, servants, hirelings: the majority of adults in the new na­
tion.55 Michelman might respond that mining this recessive radical vein 
of the Founders' thought as a "visionary [constitutional] resource" to-
49. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Prop-
erty, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987). 
50. Id. at 1331 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. at 1332. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1323-24. 
54. See SUNSIEIN, supra note 35, at 138-39. 
55. See generally LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF TIIE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEO­
LOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 119-20, 139, 159 (1980); Linda K. Kerber, Making Re­
publicanism Useful, 97 YALE LJ. 1663 (1988). 
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day does not commit us to maintaining their "exclusionary membership 
doctrines."56 I agree. Still, if one tries imaginatively to transport this re­
cessive vein of Jefferson's and Madison's thinking across two centuries 
of social and political change and tap it as a normative resource today, 
welfare rights are not what one most readily finds. True, both men 
thought the new republic could ill afford a large and permanent class of 
poor and propertyless, yet unenslaved, white men. Their solution was 
not enhancing poor relief, however. Poor relief left "paupers" depend­
ent and, therefore, unqualified for citizenship. They favored ample ma­
terial opportunities for all white men willing and able to exploit them, 
and charity or coercion for the rest.57 
To a Madison or Jefferson, the socioeconomic key to individual 
freedom and citizenly independence was ownership of productive 
property, and at various times both men said citizens had a right to 
sufficient property upon which to work to support themselves and 
their families and championed broad distributive policies on that ba­
sis.58 Sunstein's and Michelman's own citations and quotations of the 
two men seem to run in this direction - toward a "fundamental right 
[to the wherewithal] to labor" freely and with decent recompense59 -
rather than in the direction that Sunstein and Michelman point them. 
Why then do they look the other way? Why neglect the fundamental 
role of work and a decent livelihood in defining "equal respect"? 
Several factors probably played a part. First, the idea of a constitu­
tional right to welfare is a product of the late 60s - early 70s, a mo­
ment in the career of American liberalism when "race and poverty" 
supplanted "employment" as the nation's central "social problem" in 
the mainstream liberal lexicon. For reasons we will explore, New 
Deal job creation and full employment policies had not gained an en-
56. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of 
Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20, 40-41, 43-47 {1986). 
57. Both Madison and Jefferson insisted that the principle solution to poverty and de­
pendency lay in a broad distribution of property. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE 
REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 126-27 (1980). Madison and 
Jefferson also emphasized education and, for those lacking initiative, the workhouse. See 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STAIB OF VIRGINIA 133 (Univ. N.C. Press 1955) (1787) 
{favoring public charity for the poor lacking "strength to labor" and the workhouse for 
"vagabonds, without visible property or vocation"); DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE 
FATHERS: JAMESMADISONANDTHEREPUBLICANLEGACY201-04 (1989). 
58. Thus, in his Draft Constitution for Virginia, Jefferson included under "Rights Pri­
vate and Public," a provision that "Every person of full age ... shall be entitled to an ap­
propriation of 50 acres . .. in full and absolute dominion." THOMAS JEFFERSON, DRAFT 
CONSTITIJTION FOR VIRGINIA, § 4 (June, 1776) (1806), reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 244, 248 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). Jefferson also wrote that the "funda­
mental right to labour," as it belongs to the unemployed poor, may trump the property 
rights of large landholders. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct 28, 
1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 25 FEBRUARY TO 31 OCTOBER 1785, at 
682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953). 
59. Id. 
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during institutional base, and most civil rights liberals saw generous 
welfare entitlements as the more attainable and the more progressive 
bulwark against black poverty. Welfare, unlike work, already stood as 
a federal entitlement, however paltry and limited; welfare belonged to 
the language and administration of rights as spoken and practiced by 
post-War liberals. Ironically, the very ways in which "welfare" had 
been severed from other forms of social provision and had come to be 
associated especially with poor black ghetto-dwellers appeared to 
render it a right claimed on a "discrete and insular" minority's behalf, 
and this had come to seem essential. For the vast majority of Ameri­
cans, it seemed, New Deal labor reforms combined with responsible 
fiscal management by liberal economists had solved the problems of 
unemployment and underemployment, starvation wages, and work­
place exploitation and powerlessness. At any rate, these had been 
class-wide problems, and if they recurred, presumably, a political ma­
jority like Roosevelt's, or at least a formidable class-based bloc of vot­
ers, would demand redress. The constituents of such reform would 
not be a politically powerless minority, nor discrete and insular. Their 
injuries, then, would not be caste-like, and, therefore, not constitu­
tional. "Caste and not class inequalities" are the "evils against which 
the promise of equal citizenship is aimed."60 
B. Constitutional Sociology 
Of course, this sharp dichotomy between the injuries of caste and class 
is one I mean to undo. Let us define class in the usual way. Class 
speaks to one's position in the labor and other markets and in the 
great enterprise of social production and reproduction. Class pertains 
to the kind of work and resources one contributes to that enterprise 
and the fruits one reaps from it. Thus defined, class continues to be 
set off against caste in constitutional scholarship. Consider Jack 
Balkin's important recent article about the kind of social theory we 
need for understanding constitutional equality. 61 Balkin builds, as I do, 
on "the tradition of legal academic writing beginning with Karst and 
Fiss" "that looks to sociological realities to understand the Constitu­
tion's commitments to social equality." Balkin usefully links this tra­
dition to Max Weber's notion of "status." Thus, for Balkin, constitu­
tional equality is equality of "status" or "standing"; and following 
Weber, Balkin defines status as a group attribute, which speaks to the 
60. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, supra note 21. Similarly, Sunstein tells us 
that egalitarianism "defined as an effort to ensure against great disparities" in economic re­
sources and power is "foreign" to American constitutional culture. SUNSTEIN, supra note 
35, at 138. 
61. See Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALEL.J. 2313 {1997). 
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"different degrees of respect and esteem" groups command.62 Status 
groups exist in hierarchies; "their identities are not free standing," but 
defined in relationship to one another, in a system of social meanings in 
which one group enjoys "positive associations and another correspond­
ingly negative associations."63 
Thus "unjust status hierarchy" is Balkin's term for "caste" as the 
older liberal thinkers we've canvassed have used that word: groups 
treated as unworthy of equal respect or participation. Race was the 
paradigm case of caste in Karst's, Michelman's, and Fiss's early essays; 
race, gender, and homosexuality are Balkin's paradigm cases of unjust 
status hierarchies.64 Like the older scholars, Balkin juxtaposes the sali­
ence of status groups with the irrelevance of the "idea of economic 
class." He contrasts status groups to "interest groups," which he treats 
as equivalent to classes, joined by material interests and instrumental 
considerations, common positions in labor and other markets - not 
matters of identity and respect.65 
Here is where Balkin slips. Analytically separable, class and status 
hierarchies are not distinct social phenomena. They overlap and 
shape one another.66 Work, the nature of a person's contribution to 
the social enterprise and how that contribution is socially valued, goes 
a long way toward determining her status or standing. Work has 
much to do with defining the person. Not only cash but respect, 
honor, and recognition - the currencies of status - circulate here. 
Complex patterns of respect, deference, and degradation form around 
occupational and class hierarchies, but all the empirical literature sug­
gests that the most salient border between minimum respect and deg­
radation in today's class structure falls along the line between those 
who are recognized by organized society as working and providing a 
decent living for themselves and their families (or those housewives 
who "belong" to households with husbands fulfilling that role), and 
those men and women at the bottom of the class hierarchy who are 
not. The majority of this group are neither "unemployed" nor sup­
ported by "welfare"; they belong to the category denoted "working 
62. Id. at 2322. 
63. Id. at 2322-23. 
64. Karst's recent scholarship offers compelling sociological and constitutional analyses 
of the status degradation of women and gay Americans. See KENNETII L. KARST, LA W'S 
PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE PoLmcs OF RACE, GENDER, AND 
RELIGION (1993). 
65. See Balkin, supra note 61, at 2321-22. 
66. Balkin observes that "[t]here can be and often are significant overlaps between 
status identity and economic class," id. at 2322, but he does not pursue the point, which is 
not simply one of conceptual refinement. It bears directly on Balkin's question: What are 
the salient forms of group subordination for a constitutional outlook committed to social 
equality? 
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poor" by government statistics.67 That is, they are working full-time 
for wages but don't earn enough to secure a minimally decerit liveli­
hood for themselves and those for whom we, and they, believe they 
ought to provide. The social citizenship tradition, as we'll see, always 
highlighted the constitutional salience not only of joblessness but also 
of such degraded toil and its consequences in second-class citizenship; 
economists and sociologists document the persistence, and even 
marked growth, of this category of work over the past two decades, 
and the stigma and debilitation it still inflicts.68 
For many scholars, caste (but not necessarily status and not class) 
degradation denotes membership in a group that is seen as physically 
different and inferior, and identifying groups as other and inferior 
continues to justify the harshest subjugation. In this respect, caste and 
class have always diverged. Work is where, from the nation's begin­
nings, they have met in constitutionally salient ways. Following the 
1970s fault lines, however, Balkin tends to view class in splendid isola­
tion. Class and interest groups do not need constitutional protection. 
Their economic commonalities do not implicate constitutional values; 
moreover, they are preeminently capable of looking after their common 
interests in the political marketplace. Wage earners, after all, constitute 
a majority of the voting population. That much the Lochner outlook 
got right. But if the Constitution ought not to have prevented majori­
tarian meddling with the market or political economy in the name of 
some good that working people want, it surely does not compel such 
meddling. The boundaries of our constitutional tradition on this ques­
tion are defined by the laissez-faire Constitution on the conservative 
side, and the Holmesian view69 on the liberal or "Progressive" side. The 
latter prevailed. Constitutionally compelling any redistributive alloca­
tion of our nation's "wealth and resources" in this fashion is "foreign" to 
the whole conversation.70 Moreover, it would "congest" what are prop­
erly pragmatic "political choice[s]" in an intolerable manner.71 
That seems to me roughly what all these thinkers assume. And their 
assumptions are not wrong as far as the conversation of constitutional 
courts is concerned. But more and more, they have chosen to speak to 
lawmakers and "democratic arenas" in the knowledge that the Constitu-
67. See Monica Castillo, A Profile of the Working Poor, 1993 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics, Report 896, 1995). 
68. See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE, THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, 
POVER1Y, AND WELFARE 38-53 (1997); CATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: 
THE WORKING POOR IN THE INNER CITY (1999). 
69. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
("[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory . . . .  "). 
70. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 138. 
71. Sager, supra note 6, at 417. 
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tion "does not only mean what the judges say it means."72 Like Sun­
stein, Balkin has assailed the court-centeredness of our "constitutional 
canon" and our "willful ignorance of nonjudicial interpreters" of the 
Constitution - above all, our ignorance of the constitutional thinking of 
the leaders of the "social movements" engaged in "mass political ac­
tion" that have done the real work of seeking and bringing about "con­
stitutional changes."73 When one actually studies what has been thought 
and said about the Constitution in "democratic arenas" by "social 
movements," however, one finds a long and pragmatic tradition of con­
stitutional discourse about class inequality and equal citizenship. In this 
tradition are many antecedents to Karst's and Michelman's great essays 
on the caste-like debilitation and indignities of poverty and the social 
meaning of equal citizenship. But, to borrow a popular slogan, the an­
tecedents are about work, not welfare. Or rather, they are about work, 
livelihoods, and social provision writ large, not welfare for the very poor 
alone. Contrary to standard learning, "great disparities" of economic 
resources have been a central concern - not only for social movements, 
but for mainstream politicians and national leaders - in a constitutional 
past that our continuing confinement to court-centered history has led 
us to forget. 
C. Caste versus Class? Work, Citizenship, and the Law of the 
Master's Household 
Work is indispensable to equal status or standing, perhaps more so 
in the U.S. than in most nations.74 As far back as the beginning of the 
republic, Americans spoke of the dignity of work.75 And as our brief 
discussion of Madison and Jefferson suggested, the Founders saw a link 
between work and citizenship. But it was not work in general that they 
dignified, and not all kinds of labor qualified one for citizenship - cer­
tainly not slave labor nor the uncompensated toil of women in their 
husbands' households.76 Nor did the servant's or hireling's labor equip 
him for citizenship in the eyes of Jefferson, Madison, or most other 
eighteenth-century political thinkers. Unlike the wife, slave, or inden­
tured servant, the hireling was, in theory, free and self-owning; still, his 
72. SUNS1EIN, supra note 35, at vi, 10. 
73. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 963, 1016, 1022-23 (1998). 
74. See Forbath, supra note 42, at 1791 ("Countless sociologists and historians have told 
us that in the United States, perhaps more than in most other nations, work is essential to a 
person's standing as an equal member of the co=unity and polity."). 
75. See JONATHAN A. GLICKSTEIN, CONCEPTS OF FREE LABOR IN ANTEBELLUM 
AMERICA 1-49 (1991); DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK Ennc IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 
1850-1920, at5-17 (1978). 
76. See KERBER, supra note 55; MORGAN, supra note 3; Robert J, Steinfeld, Property 
and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989). 
October 1999] Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship 19 
hireling status meant he had forfeited not simply his property in his own 
. labor, but his economic independence, and with it, the franchise. Like 
the pauper, the slave, or the wife, the hireling was deemed a "depend­
ent." Through most of the nineteenth century, employment law re­
mained lodged in the master's household, in treatises on "domestic rela­
tions." Like the other members of the master's household, the servant's 
relation to his master was one of dependence and subjection, of disci­
pline, governance, and control. 
The political theories of the Framers confirmed that the hireling's 
status of dependence and submission disqualified him for citizenship.77 
Indeed, most states at first restricted suffrage to the independent free­
holder. By the 1820s, however, there were too many propertyless white 
tenants, journeymen, and hirelings demanding the ballot - and pro­
testing the lack of it as an affront to their dignity and interests.78 With 
the enfranchisement of male wage earners and the growing ranks of 
white males occupying that propertyless status, white America increas­
ingly defined freedom in stark contrast to slavery.79 A slave was a 
"marketable commodity" owned and exchanged by masters; he had no 
right to his own body and was "robbed of all the just rewards of his la­
bor." Speaking of the slave's misery, one abolitionist simply asked, 
"Can a chattel make a contract?"80 The industrializing North had begun 
to redefine the dominant view of freedom. Ownership of productive 
property, long understood as a necessary basis of economic "independ­
ence," was being erased, in favor of a narrower definition of freedom as 
simply self-ownership and the right to sell one's labor power. 
Even as they assailed "wage slavery," white male wage earners in 
the North defended their "dignity" and "independence" as working­
men, asserting thereby their proper economic standing and rightful 
place in the political community. Employers and employees, Republi­
can politicians, and middle-class antislavery tribunes like Garrison all 
had their reasons to invoke certain broad, idealized and ambiguous 
formulations. A slave was dependent, bound by law to work for a mas­
ter's profit and under his control; a free citizen was independent, with 
77. Some hewed to a more fully caste-bound construction of the lower ranks of the 
white laboring classes, which saw them and their offspring as fit only for drudge work. Be­
ginning with the antebellum Irish in America, generations of new immigrants occupying the 
lowest ranks of the industrial order continued to be treated as racially inferior drudges. See 
GLICKSTEIN, supra note 75, at 99-104. 
78. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, CrnzEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN 
THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH 
CEN1URY 14-20 (1993); Steinfeld, supra note 76. 
79. See ERIC FONER, PoLmcs AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF CivIL w AR 61-72 (1980); 
William E. Forbath, Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 
WISC. L. RE.v. 767, 779-86. On the English side, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM 
OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 346-501 (1973). 
80. William Goodell, Goodell's Anti-Slavery Lectures, reprinted in THE LIBERATOR 1, 3 
(Apr. 5, 1839). 
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the liberty to work for his own and his family's benefit. They all digni­
fied remunerative work freely pursued and the autonomy it signified 
and seemingly enabled. By the mid-nineteenth century, this had be­
come the material touchstone of suffrage and full citizenship in the new 
republic. To lack these incidents of free labor was to be dependent and, 
therefore, inferior, unable to assume responsibility for oneself and one's 
family and unworthy of the standing and responsibilities of full member­
ship in community life.81 
All the great movements of disenfranchised social groups in nine­
teenth-century America, therefore, had this in common. They con­
fronted the legal order with challenges to "systems of dependency . . .  
centered on control over work and its rewards."82 This was so of the an­
tislavery and later black freedom movements; it was so of the tenant 
farmers' organizations, black and white, which produced Populism; it 
was so of women's rights movements; and, paradoxically, it was also so 
of white workingmen's movements. 
Throughout this long period, white workingmen often defined their 
identity as citizens in terms of being not black and not women. But this 
drive to discriminate was fueled partly by a dread sense of commonality. 
White workingmen had the ballot and the legal status of masters in rela­
tion to wives and daughters. Still, in important ways that centered 
(again) around work, they were dependent, subordinated, and unfree 
like women and blacks. 
They were simply hirelings, "free labor" not in Abraham Lincoln's 
but in Adam Smith's sense; no legal bonds tied them to particular tasks 
or masters. They were free to sell their own labor. The contrast with 
slavery showed this was no mean freedom. At the same time, the 
growing social and economic power of employers in a new era of indus­
trial capitalism reminded them of the republican axiom: that productive 
property was the basis of true freedom and citizenly independence. 
Without that kind of property, dependency and subordination loomed.83 
The language and institutions of the law confirmed the unfree and 
subjugated character of wage labor; for as nineteenth-century treatise 
writers freely conceded, the common law of employment bore many of 
the "marks of social caste."84 The common law "presupposes two par­
ties who stand on an unequal footing in their mutual dealings," and 
"[t]his relation" admittedly is "hostile to the genius of free institu-
81. See Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work, supra note 39, at 531. 
82. Id. at 537. 
83. On the contrast and links between Smith's classical liberal and Lincoln's republican 
definitions of "free labor," see Forbath, supra note 79, at 773-82. 
84. JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS 599 
(1874), quoted in CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 292 (1993). 
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tions."85 Contrary to standard accounts of "laissez-faire" capitalism, the 
law of the employment relationship in nineteenth- and early twentieth­
century America remained one of hierarchy and subordination, of status 
as much as of free contract.86 As the nation industrialized, employment 
law remained lodged in the master's household - in treatises on "do­
mestic relations" - and the servant's relation to his master was one of 
discipline and control. "The title of master and servant . . . does not 
sound very harmoniously to republican ears," acknowledged another 
treatise writer. But "the legal relation of master and servant must ex­
ist . . .  wherever civilization furnishes work to be done," and so that doc­
trine remained the core of the republic's law of employment.87 
The felt necessity of governing the industrial workplace, of disci­
plining an unruly work force, often recently immigrated from rural set­
tings overseas, and of controlling a trade union movement intent on 
challenging employers' authority and setting work rules of its own - all 
made the old common law of master and servant resonate with modem 
times.88 Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
courts melded centuries-old master-servant law with modem contract 
doctrine, and continued to recognize an employer's property interests in 
his employee/servants' labor, his right to their loyalty and obedience, his 
right to enjoin and unleash state violence against their organizing ef­
forts, and his virtually unbounded sway over their wages, hours, and 
conditions.89 "The relation of employer and employee," the Court 
BS. Id. 
86. See KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERALDEVEL­
OPMENTINTHE UNITED STATES (1991); TOMLINS, supra note 84. 
87. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION To AMERICAN LAW 243 (1837); see also 
HORACE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 3-4 (1877). See gen­
erally TOMLINS, supra note 84, at 232-93 (arguing that the law of master and servant actu­
ally grew more pervasive in American courts during the nineteenth century compared to 
the preceding century). 
88. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AsSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR 
LAW 11-16 (1983); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT, 59-97 (1991); MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ANGLO­
AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE {1989). Thus, for example, the old common 
law action against enticing away another's servants continued to thrive in the nineteenth 
century, transmuted into tortious interference with contract but most often employing the 
old language of enticement. See TOMLINS, supra note 84, at 278-84. Even in the 1910s and 
'20s, it helped provide precedent and a judicial habit of mind that made it seem natural to 
enjoin union organizing among contract-bound miners, as a new incarnation of an ancient 
wrong. See FORBATH,supra, at 115-18. 
89. See FORBATH, supra note 88; ORREN, supra note 86; ROBERT STEINFELD, THE 
lNVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 
LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1992); TOMLINS, supra note 84. 
Drawing on Reva Siegel's work, Balkin's essay on status notes that in pre-modem eras 
"[l]egal categories like 'slave' or 'master and servant' were not only legal distinctions but 
helped support a system of social hierarchy." Balkin, supra note 61, at 2326 n.36 (citing 
Reva Siege� "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117 (1996)). Thus, Balkin recognizes that in premodem societies, class and status catego­
ries often were identical, and law helped define both; but for him, class as a status category 
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could still proclaim in 1935, is "one of the domestic relations."90 
When unemployed, white male members of the industrial working 
class continued to feel the sting of caste. The tens of thousands of wan­
dering unemployed turned loose from the factories by the nation's first 
industrial depression in 1877 brought forth one of the country's first 
campaigns for uniform state laws - the "tramp acts." By the 1890s, 
forty-four states had enacted such measures, which recast the crime of 
vagrancy from an emphasis on begging to one on wandering without 
work.91 "Harsh as it may seem," declared Yale Law School's influential 
dean, Francis Wayland, the law must treat "those who honestly desire 
employment, but can find nothing to do" in the same manner that it 
deals with "those who are unwilling to labor."92 Regarding the latter, 
Joel Bishop's great criminal law treatise made the point clearly: "there 
is, in just principle, nothing which a government has more clearly the 
right to do than to compel the lazy to work; and there is nothing more 
absolutely beyond its jurisdiction than to fix the price of labor."93 
This separate political world of employment seemed to be as the le­
gal commentators described it, devoid of citizenship. This rule of the 
courts over the core social relations of work and livelihood invested 
with the permanence of fundamental law and constitutionally walled off 
from the changeability of democracy, was a caste-ridden regime. And 
this meant that organized white male workers had a certain vision and 
vocabulary of reform in common with the other inhabitants of the mas-
seems to drop away with "modernization." Siegel, by contrast, has focused on the preserva­
tion of status hierarchies through "modernizing" liberal legal reforms - a process she notes 
in class as well as in racial and gender relations. Along with race and gender, propertyless­
ness, hireling status, and unemployment, the lack of waged labor - class indicia - endured 
well into modem times as a basis for denying equal standing, social recognition, and ordi­
nary civil and political rights. Indeed, it's been in the area of employment law history that 
the most detailed research has been done, tracing how the categories, constraints, and out­
look of pre-modem (master-servant) law continued to shape modem (employment) law 
into the early 20th century and beyond. As with the modem legal forms of racial and gen­
der subordination that Siegel analyzes, so with employment. Courts drew upon the lan­
guage of private rights - private contract, property, and managerial prerogative - to re­
construct and fortify remnants of older traditions of subordination. See Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1115 (1997); see also ATLESON, supra note 88; FORBATII, supra 
note 88: ORREN, supra note 86; ROBERT STEINFELD, THE COERCIONS OF CONTRACT 
(forthcoming 2000); TOMLINS, supra note 84. 
90. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308 {1936). 
91. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 78, at 87; PAUL T. RINGENBACH, TRAMPS AND 
REFORMERS, 1873-1916: THE DISCOVERY OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORI< 22-24 (1973); 
Sidney L. Harring, Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-1894, 11 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 873, 879 (1977). 
92. Francis Wayland, The Tramp Question, in PROCEEDINGS OFTIIE FOURTII ANNUAL 
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ter's old legal household: a vision of autonomy and respect based on 
dignifying, socially recognized work, with relations of mutuality, coop­
eration, and exchange based on equality with erstwhile "masters," and a 
rights rhetoric aimed against caste and legalized subordination. They 
would have refused the opposition between caste and class; their consti­
tutional advocacy occupied the site where the two were inextricably 
joined. 
II. THE SOCIAL CmZENSHIP TRADmON BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 
A. Expounding the Constitution Outside the Courts? 
Shaped as we are by the legacy of Brown, we find it hard to imagine 
a reform-minded constitutionalism that is not countermajoritarian. We 
assume that rights talk not linked to claims on behalf of minorities can­
not really be constitutional. Yet, for the most prominent exponents of 
the social citizenship tradition, the intuitive link we feel between consti­
tutional rights deprivation and minority status simply did not exist. If 
anything, most Populist, Progressive, and labor movement advocates 
saw that linkage as part of the enemy's conceptual artillery - the refuge 
of grasping employers and trusts. Still, we're inclined to think: Litiga­
tion is costly, rights talk is cheap. 
And rights claims are ubiquitous. In speaking of alternative and op­
positionist constitutional outlooks, I refer to more sustained systems of 
thought and expression. These tethered claims of right to conceptions 
of citizenship and the powers and duties of state and national govern­
ment, they addressed the meaning of popular sovereignty and the inter­
pretive authority and substantive powers of courts versus legislatures; 
and they linked these to narratives of the Founding, the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, and to theories of constitutional change and continuity 
in the context of an industrializing society. 
The notion of a Constitution changing over time to meet new social 
needs and popular aspirations was not born among reformers or 
radicals.94 Conservative Whig jurists like Justice Story developed the 
idea of the Constitution as an evolving institution in response to the 
populist challenges of antebellum America. Warning that an 
unchanging Constitution would only fuel the popular conviction that a 
republican polity must be "revolutionized at every critical period, and 
remodeled in every generation," Story insisted on rules of constitutional 
interpretation responsive to the changing "manners, habits, and 
institutions of society."95 But for Story, this interpretive task belonged 
94. But see Horwitz, supra note 7, at 51-57 (attributing idea of changing Constitution to 
Progressives). 
95. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUITONAL THEORY 41 (1992) (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
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to the legal elite. It was Lincoln and other antislavery politicians of the 
new Republican Party who knitted the conservative language of a 
changing, evolving Constitution to the much older idea of constitutional 
interpretation as a popular political project, and fashioned an evolving 
antislavery Constitution whose egalitarian meanings must unfold in 
time. 
The Framers, in Lincoln's phrase, made the egalitarian principles of 
the Declaration of Independence the "apple of gold" of which the Con­
stitution and the Union were merely a "silver picture . . .  framed around 
it."96 They lacked, however, both the opportunity and the will to get the 
right fit between the Declaration and the Constitution; the constitu­
tional frame was flawed and imperfect, but unfinished and reinterpre­
table. Getting the two texts to fit properly together, in Lincoln's ac­
count, was a task the Framers left to future generations, and he called 
on his generation of citizen-interpreters to spurn the proslavery Consti­
tution of the Court and instead to complete the Founders' "unfinished 
work" of "Liberty for All."97 The hermeneutics of an evolving antislav­
ery Constitution, renewed and realized over time by citizens and legisla­
tors and often opposed by the courts, would find many later practitio­
ners who called on succeeding generations to complete the "unfinished 
work" both of the Founders, and of Lincoln and the antislavery 
amendments. 
How did these reformers respond when courts struck down as 
unconstitutional the kinds of measures their Constitution demanded? 
Just as Lincoln attributed Dred Scott to the Court's complicity in a 
"Slave Power Conspiracy,"98 many Gilded Age agrarian and labor 
reformers laid labor injunctions and decisions voiding rate regulation 
and hours laws at the feet of the "Money Power" and the "Trusts." On 
this theory, the courts were corrupt, their constitutional interpretations 
counterfeit, and the reformers' true. But, as we will see, corruption and 
conspiracy were not the reformers' only explanatory key. Populists and 
Progressives alike often held that the courts were not so much corrupt 
as anachronistic. Judges woodenly applied inherited common law 
understandings of constitutional rights in ways that stymied social 
reforms designed to further the very values of citizenly independence 
and dignity the rights were meant to secure. 
CONSlTIUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 143 {3d ed. 1858)). 
96. GARY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSlTIUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE 
UNITED STATES 3 {1993); GYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRmCISMS OF 
LAW {forthcoming, 2000) (manuscript at 28, on file with author). 
97. HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 315-16 (1982); Abraham Lincoln, Speech at 
Chicago {July 10, 1858), in THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 445-51 {Philip 
Van Doren ed., 1940). 
98. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield (June 16, 1858), in CREATED EQUAL? THE 
CoMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 1-7 {Paul M. Angle ed., 1958). 
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This was the social citizenship rendition of the changing, evolving 
Constitution. It was coupled with a longstanding debate over the 
allocation of interpretive authority. Again invoking Lincoln, these 
advocates assailed judicial supremacy and insisted on the coequal 
authority of the other branches. Antimonopolists in political economy, 
they attacked the courts' presumed "Monopoly of Power to interpret 
the Constitution."99 But they also often took leave of Lincoln and 
joined Jefferson, the Kentucky Resolution, and the states' rights 
tradition, declaring that state lawmakers, as the most direct 
representatives of the sovereign people, were better equipped than 
federal courts to determine the Constitution's metes and bounds. In 
either case, they invoked a long tradition, as old as the Constitution 
itself, attacking as usurpation the courts' sway over political economy, 
their walling off of key issues of economic development from popular 
government. Jefferson and Jackson were marshaled behind the 
Populist and, later, the New Deal cause of authorizing legislators to 
secure the economic rights and liberties of citizens. 
But whose rights and liberties, whose citizenship, was being champi­
oned? For the most part, the social citizenship tradition's spokesmen 
and their constituents were white men. Their tendency to define citi­
zenship in racialized and gendered terms had bleak consequences, I will 
argue, for the fortunes of their own constitutional visions as well as 
other more inclusive ones. However, they forged a democratic­
majoritarian style of constitutional interpretation and politicking that we 
have forgotten. In reconstructing this tradition of constitutional politics, 
I do not commend it as preferable to the court-inspired ideal of the 
Constitution as countermajoritarian safeguard of "discrete and insular 
minorities." Morally, I think, the insights of each reveal much of the 
other's blindness. Historically, I will argue, their fates have been tied in 
ways we have ignored. 
B. Social Citizenship from Reconstruction through Populism, 
1865-1896 
The language of equal citizenship did not loom large in the Constitu­
tion prior to the Civil War and the adoption of the Reconstruction 
amendments.100 Since then, however, subordinated groups have laid 
claim to the status of citizens and rights bearers in language rooted in 
those amendments. As Hendrik Hartog observes, "[t]he long contest 
over slavery did more than any other cause to stimulate the develop­
ment of an alternate, rights conscious, interpretation of the federal con-
99. See infra text accompanying note 205. 
100. See Stanley N. Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equal­
ity, 15 J. AM. HIST. 747, 747 (1988). 
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stitution."101 The varying meanings that have been drawn from the 
phrase "equal protection of the laws" are "rooted in contending visions 
of what it was that was overthrown by the end of slavery."102 
1. Post-Bellum Republicans, Labor Reformers, and the Origins of 
Social Citizenship 
By dint of the Reconstruction amendments, "We the People" had 
become in 1867 "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States," 
irrespective of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The na­
tion broke this promise of equality, but not before those who led the 
battles for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments out­
lined an understanding of equal citizenship that spoke to the social and 
economic circumstances not only of former slaves, but also of white free 
laborers. Even the most conservative Republicans agreed on the core 
rights of contract, property, and personal liberty. Now these rights were 
"universal."103 But to the Radical Republicans, they were hardly suffi­
cient to underpin the freedmen's new status as citizens. Citizenship de­
manded suffrage; and the independence of the freedmen's ballots re­
quired material foundations. That entailed not only equal rights to 
contract and own property, but also to public education and training. 
Some agreed with Thaddeus Stevens that equal citizenship for the 
freedmen also demanded land redistribution - "forty acres and a 
mule," in the famous phrase.104 The idea was not limited to former 
slaves. Stevens and other Republicans pressed for generous homestead 
laws and land grant colleges for white hirelings in the North. They 
thought, in Akhil Amar's apt phrase, that property was "so essential for 
both individual and collective self-governance" that "every citizen 
should have some."105 
As the Labor Question eclipsed the Slavery Question in the politics 
of the rapidly industrializing postbellum North, it too had a constitu­
tional cast. Invoking constitutional provisions aimed at protecting the 
rights of black ex-slaves in the South to support rights for white workers 
101. Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and the "Rights That Belong to Us 
All," 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1017 {1987). 
102. Id. 
103. Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of 
Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471, 474-75 {1988). 
104. "In a speech to Pennsylvania's Republican convention in September 1965, Stevens 
called for the seizure of the 400 million acres belonging to the wealthiest 10 percent of South­
erners. Forty acres would be granted to each adult freedman and the remainder - some 90 
percent of the total - sold 'to the highest bidder' in plots, he later added, no larger than 500 
acres." Even among radicals, there was no unanintlty on the land question; many proved reluc­
tant to support a program th'at seemed to run so far afoul of the sanctity of private property. 
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
235-36 {1988). 
105. Amar, supra note 21, at37. 
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in the North was not farfetched. As Eric Foner has shown, defending 
white free labor had always loomed large in the Republicans' antislav­
ery outlook,106 and the party's leadership repeatedly declared that the 
Reconstruction amendments embodied a promise of universal freedom, 
limited to "neither black nor white."107 
The Black Codes, passed by the southern states in 1865-66 rein­
stated a race-based caste system, keeping blacks as an inferior and de­
pendent class by disabling them from owning, renting, or transferring 
property, pursuing skilled callings, or seeking access to courts. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was Congress's response. At a minimum, all Repub­
licans meant to outlaw those legal disabilities, but many thought the new 
amendments went further. Beyond the unique harshness of this form of 
racial subjugation, law and state power could be used to hem resource­
less white working people into a dependent and degraded - caste-like 
- condition. It could invest groups or classes of the propertied with 
"peculiar privileges and powers,"108 and enshrine, in Thaddeus Stevens's 
words, "the recognized degradation of the poor, and the superior caste 
of the rich."109 This too the new Amendments should forbid. Republi­
cans also celebrated the Thirteenth Amendment as a charter of free la­
bor, aimed at ending the degradation of labor, "both black and 
white,"110 "subduing that spirit" which "makes the laborer the mere tool 
of the capitalist."m 
Concern for the laborer's freedom found eloquent expression in the 
Supreme Court's first important encounter with the Reconstruction 
amendments. The plaintiff butchers in the Slaughter-House Cases112 
were exemplars of Lincoln's "Free Labor System." They were shop­
owning artisans, and in the new monopoly created by the Louisiana 
legislature these "Free Laborers" saw a serious threat that they would 
be reduced to the condition of mere hirelings. Their petition for a pre­
liminary injunction alleged that the challenged statute would "subject 
the labor of all existing butchers to the control" of the new corpora-
106. See generally ERICFONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CrvlL WAR (1970). 
107. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wilson), quoted in 
Lea VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 
446 (1989); see also HERMAN BEIZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: PoLmCS AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CrvlL WAR ERA 108-40 (1978); CHARLEs FAIRMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE, at 1117-49 (HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SERIES Vol. VI, 1971). 
108. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1866) (proposal by Sen. Sumner), quoted 
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tion.113 Yet, as Justices Field and Bradley declared in their famous 
Slaughter-House dissents, the Reconstruction amendments had prom­
ised to secure "every one's" right freely to "pursue certain callings" and 
enjoy the "fruits of his labor."114 Indeed, this "equality of right" in the 
pursuits of life was "the fundamental idea upon which our institutions 
rest, and unless adhered to in the legislation of the country our govern­
ment will be a republic only in name."115 Arguing that the Louisiana 
monopoly violated this "equality of right" and with it "the right of free 
labor," Field and Bradley seemed to enshrine the venerable republican 
definition of freedom as economic independence, which animated the 
Free.Labor ideology of the 1850s and '60s.116 However, the Slaughter­
House Cases would remain virtually the only cases in which the right 
to pursue a calling and the right of free labor were invoked on behalf 
of working men or women who owned productive property. The 
scores of subsequent decisions in which the Slaughter-House dissents 
figure as leading precedents say nothing about the free laborer's right 
to the "fruits of his own labor." The working men and women in this 
prodigious line of cases were all wage-eamers.117 What they produced 
belonged to their employers; their constitutional liberty lay in selling 
their labor to those disposed to employ them. So, Slaughter-House's 
pristine Free Labor reading of the Fourteenth Amendment unfolded in 
strikingly different directions: toward Lochner and liberty of contract in 
the nation's courts, and toward an egalitarian and anticorporate radi­
calism in the hands of the Gilded Age labor movement. 
Industrialization had changed the social meaning of constitutional 
equality, Reconstruction and Gilded Age labor reformers argued. For 
Lincoln, the hireling's lot was almost as unfree as the slave's, but it was a 
brief way-station on the road to owning productive property. With the 
rise of large-scale production, however, and the increasing 
concentration of ownership of resources and capital, today's hireling 
was no longer - what Lincoln's "Free Labor System" promised -
tomorrow's proprietor. Artisans and skilled factory workers found 
themselves competing against new machines and new unskilled and 
underpaid workers. The big capitalists - who bought the machines and 
hired dispossessed artisans and new immigrants and their families, 
bringing millions of working-class women and children into the factories 
- seemed a new aristocracy, whose wealth and power were built on 
113. M. Dudziak, The Social History of the Sla11ghter-Ho11se Cases 28 (1983) (unpub-
lished manuscript), q11oted in Forbath, s11pra note 79, at 776. 
114. 83 U.S. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 109, 110. 
116. Id. at 109, 110 (Field, J., dissenting). 
117. I canvass the cases and offer a more detailed reading of Sla11ghter-Ho11se in 
Forbath, s11pra note 79. 
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oppression.118 
Just as the capitalist strove to grind down wages, so he abused the 
new technologies and "labor-saving devices" by "cheapening labor" and 
demanding longer and longer hours of "mindless toil," that deprived 
workingmen of the time to educate themselves and participate in public 
affairs. Under the "wages system," "progress" seemed to have the 
ironic consequence of producing its opposite, more "dependence," 
more "ignorance," and more "grinding poverty" among each 
succeeding generation of workers. The capitalists' wealth was being 
purchased at the price of making the working class unfit for 
citizenship.119 
This irony animated George McNeill as he wrote on behalf of the 
International Labor Union in 1873, the same year Field and Bradley 
authored their Slaughter-House dissents. "There is an inevitable and ir­
resistible conflict," McNeill declared, "between the wage-system of la­
bor and the republican system of govemment."120 A similar declaration 
appeared in the preamble to the constitution of the Gilded Age's largest 
and most prominent labor organization, the Knights of Labor.121 Just as 
the courts began to enshrine as a constitutional right the worker's liberty 
to sell his labor, the labor movement was forging an opposing outlook, 
which held that being forced to sell his labor contradicted the worker's 
status as a citizen. Every 1880s labor leader, from the most stolid iron 
puddler to the most radical miner, agreed that the "present industrial 
order" or the "wage system" had to give way, or the republic would 
perish.122 In 1889, Florence Kelley declared that "[u]nder the guise of 
republican freedom we have degenerated into a nation of mock citi­
zens." Genuine citizenship required that the "social structure" conform 
to the egalitarian principles of the Declaration of Independence and the 
118. Generations of social historians have reconstructed this process in painstaking detail. 
I distill much of their work in Forbath, supra note 79. For other recent syntheses, see 
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121. See George E. McNeill, Declaration of Principles of the Knights of Labor, in THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF TODAY, supra note 119, at 483-86. 
122. See Forbath, supra note 79, at 808. Almost all invoked the general ideal of a "Co­
operative Co=onwealth" in which workers "will eventually be the only capitalists," or own­
ership and control of industry will be broadly shared. Id. at 808 n.142, 809. Most favored in­
dustrial co-ops, combined with public ownership of transportation and co=unication indus­
tries; most also envisioned strong unions, combined with many statutory labor market reforms, 
as avenues for ending "wage slavery." Id. at 809. 
30 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1 
new Reconstruction amendments.123 
Thus, the work of antislavery remained "unfinished." Uprooting 
"this subtler form of slavery" demanded laws repealing the harsh 
judge-made restraints on collective action and other common law 
rules that helped underpin "wage slavery." It required statutory re­
construction of the labor market, including legal limits to the working 
day; for many labor reformers, it also entailed financial and banking 
reform and recasting corporation law - along lines similar to those 
demanded by the agrarian reformers we are about to examine - by 
using national power to create a framework for a more decentralized 
and democratic industrial economy.124 In short, "legislative bodies 
[were] bound to interfere" to preserve the Constitution's promises of 
"equality" and "a republican form of government."125 Lincoln's apple 
of gold - a republic of free labor and equal citizens - once more de­
manded reinterpreting and revising the silver frame, and spurning an 
oppressive, counterfeit Constitution being forged by the courts. 
2. The Women's Rights Movement in the Age of Emancipation 
Alongside the rights of contract and free labor, the right to marry 
and have a family was the other fundamental freedom every Republican 
agreed was enshrined by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Four­
teenth Amendment.126 This account of core citizenship rights was all of 
a piece for the freedman, but not the freedwoman nor women generally. 
Married women lacked not only the right to vote, but also the right to 
contract; their labor and its fruits belonged to their husbands.127 
Far from "universal," the "new birth of freedom," as Congress con­
ceived it, was deeply gendered. But women's advocates famously seized 
on the mainstream constitutional language of freedom as self-ownership 
and equal rights. In addition to women's suffrage, the organizations 
that led women's struggles for equal citizenship held that ending 
women's status as a "dependent and despised class" also demanded that 
women "enjoy the fruits of their own labor." Equal rights meant legal 
autonomy in market and property relations, and economic independ­
ence within the marriage relation. Yet the common law denied all these 
rights in favor of the husband. Law and social usage "oppressed [her] 
with such limitation and degradation of labor and avocation as clearly 
and cruelly mark the condition of a disabled caste." So, women's rights 
123. See ErucFONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 124 (1998). 
124. See Forbath, supra note 79, which documents and analyzes the constitutional vi­
sions and reform outlooks of the spectrum of local, state, and national labor leaders of the 
period. 
125. McNeill, supra note 119, at 462. 
126. See Stanley, supra note 103, at 480. 
127. See id. at 479-81. 
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organizations campaigned for statutes that would overturn the hus­
band's common law rights to his wife's labor, both within the household 
and outside it.128 
Passage of Married Women's Property and Earnings statutes ac­
complished part of this project. However, the property statutes gener­
ally covered only such property as wives brought with them to, or re­
ceived as gifts during, the marriage relation, which in most marriages 
was none. The hard-fought earnings statutes entitled married women to 
keep their own wages; now, one law writer declared, the married 
woman "has the right to her labor."129 But the new statutes left un­
touched the web of custom, union rules, and legal proscriptions that 
kept women out of most industrial jobs, skilled trades, and professions. 
Moreover, the earning statutes covered only wages or income earned 
outside the home, and so for the majority of working women, who 
toiled inside the household, the earnings statutes left the old doctrine of 
marital service intact.130 
Here nineteenth-century feminists did not challenge the gender divi­
sion of labor so much as the gendered definition of labor.131 The law of 
marital property, they argued, did not merely impose dependency by di­
vesting wives of rights in their labor; it defined wives as dependents who 
were "supported" by their husbands, thereby obscuring the fact that 
wives' labor had value. The "economy of the household," a Woman's 
Rights Convention resolved, "is generally as much the source of family 
wealth as the labor and enterprise of man"; yet the law effaced women's 
contribution, embedding it in property to which men held title. No less 
128. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, HELD AT WORCESTER, 
0CTOBER23D & 24TII, 1850, at 4-5 (Boston, Prentiss & Sawyer 1851), quoted in Reva B. Sie­
gel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 
1850-1880, 103 YALE LJ. 1073, 1100 (1994); see also NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE 
LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPER1Y IN NINETEENTII-CENTURY NEW YORK 162-99 
(1982) (discussing the links between women's battles for equality in the domestic sphere, con­
tract and property rights, and suffrage). 
129. GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS BY MARRIED 
WOMEN, THEIR CAPACITY TO CONTRACT IN RELATION TO THEIR SEPARATE STATUTORY 
LEGAL EsTATES, UNDER AMERICAN STATUTES 114 (1887), quoted in Stanley, supra note 
103, at 482. 
130. Only later, during the Gilded Age in a handful of Western states, and not until the 
1970s in the rest, would legislatures recognize women's joint title to the household's entire 
property and income. Thus, Reva Siegel's superb article errs in its repeated claim that the joint 
property idea- and the broader struggle for legal recognition of women's unpaid domestic la­
bor - were abandoned by women's rights advocates in the 1870s in favor of "the two-career 
marriage strategy," which focused on equal opportunities in the sphere of paid work. Siegel, 
supra note 128, at 1189-98, 1213-15. In fact, women's rights advocates figured prominently in 
the constitutional conventions that adopted such measures in several Western states during the 
Gilded Age. Likewise, "second-wave" feminists led the battles for community property re­
forms during the 1970s. See Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property 
Concepts in California's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1976). 
131. I borrow this phrase from JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEWORK, 
WAGES AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR INTHE EARLY REPUBLIC at xi-xv (1990). 
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economically productive than men, the Convention went on, women 
were entitled to participate equally in managing assets both helped to 
accumulate. In this manner, as Reva Siegel has shown, women's rights 
advocates cannily employed the mainstream constitutional language of 
self-ownership and labor rights to dismantle and reconstruct the legal 
and cultural discourse that cast women as unproductive dependents.132 
3. African Americans and the Reconstruction Roots of Social Citizenship 
Like the advocates of white workingmen in the industrial North, 
most freedmen and women in the South hewed to the old republican 
view that freedom entailed ownership of productive property; self­
ownership alone was not freedom. Most of them apparently agreed 
with Thaddeus Stevens on the necessity of confiscating the largest plan­
tations of the South and redistributing them to ex-slaves in order to se­
cure the African Americans' liberty. "Only land," said former Missis­
sippi slave Merrimon Howard, would enable "the poor class to enjoy 
the sweet boon of freedom."133 In an 1865 "colloquy" with General 
Sherman and Secretary of War Stanton, twenty "Colored Ministers" 
concurred. Asked as to "what you understand by slavery, and the free­
dom that was to be given by the President's Proclamation," ex-slave 
Garrison Frazier, a Baptist preacher and the group's spokesman, re­
plied: "The freedom, as I understand it, promised by the proclamation, 
is taking us from under the yoke of bondage and placing us where we 
could reap the fruit of our own labor, and take care of ourselves." 
"Freedom," he went on, meant that ex-slaves were entitled "to have 
land, and turn and till it by our labor . . .  and we can soon maintain our­
selves."134 
General Sherman's famous Field Order 15 embodied the view that 
the freedmen were entitled to the confiscated estates of the old planter 
elite. So did the provision of the Freedmen's Bureau Act authorizing 
the Bureau to settle freedmen on confiscated and abandoned lands. 
Sherman's field order called for using the property under Bureau con­
trol to provide freedmen with forty-acre homesteads "where by faithful 
industry they can readily achieve an independence."135 President John­
son, however, halted that experiment; he issued a rash of special par-
132. See Siegel, supra note 128, at 1112-18. 
133. Letter from Merrimon Howard to Adelbert Ames (Nov. 28, 1973) (on file with Ames 
Family papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.), quoted in Eric 
Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, Presidential Address of the Or­
ganization of American Historians (Apr. 15, 1994), in 81 J. AMER. HIST. 435, 458 {1994). 
134. Colloquy with Colored Ministers, 16 J. NEGRO HIST. 88, 90-91 (1931); see also FONER, 
supra note 104, at 68, 235-37; LEON F. LmvACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE 
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 401-04 (1979). 
135. FONER, supra note 104, at 159 {quoting Gen'I Rufus Saxton, Freedman's Bureau 
Director in Ga., S. C., and Fla.). 
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dons, restoring the property of former Confederates and ordered the 
Bureau's leader, 0. 0. Howard, to restore the freedmen's land to the 
pardoned planters. To Howard also fell the task of informing the 
freedmen that the land would be restored to their former owners and 
that they must either agree to work for the planters or be evicted. He 
journeyed to low-country South Carolina, hoping to "ease the shock as 
much as possible, of depriving the freedmen of the ownership of the 
lands."136 
At one stop on this journey, Howard requested the freedmen of 
Edisto Island to appoint a three-man committee to consider the fairest 
way of restoring ownership to the planters. Their response gave elo­
quent testimony to the convictions about land and liberty shared by 
freedmen and women throughout the South: 
General we want Homesteads; we were promised Homesteads by the gov­
ernment; If It does not carry out the promises Its agents made to us, If the 
government Haveing [sic] concluded to befriend Its late enemies and to 
neglect . . .  the principles of common faith between Its self and us Its allies 
In the war you said was over, now takes away from them all right to the soil 
they stand upon save such as they can get by again working for your late 
and thier [sic] all time enemies . . .  we are left In a more unpleasant condi­
tion than our former . . . . You will see this Is not the condition of really 
freemen.137 
' 
Most national African American leaders during Reconstruction 
took a more moderate stance on the land question than the Edisto Is­
land freedmen. They heartily agreed that freedom demanded mate­
rial independence, but, like most other prominent Republicans, the 
nation's most prominent African Americans claimed that as long as 
they had suffrage, equal civil rights fairly administered combined with 
a right to "common school" education would suffice for hard-working 
freedmen and women to become freeholders and free-standing citi­
zens. They urged ex-slaves to labor hard, save their earnings, and buy 
land on their own.138 These urgings, prompted by whatever mix of cau­
tion and conviction, did not fully reflect the rights consciousness of 
ordinary African American citizens nor of many of their local and 
state-level leaders.139 
136. Journal of S. Willard Saxton (Oct. 22, 1865) (on file with Rufus and S. Willard Sax­
ton Papers, Yale University), quoted in FONER, supra note 104, at 160. 
137. Ira Berlin et al., The Terrain of Freedom: The Struggle over the Meaning of Free 
Labor in the U.S. South, 22 HIST. WORKSHOP 108, 127-28 (1986). 
138. See FONER, supra note 104, at 54-57; Lmv ACK, supra note 134, at 399-408. 
139. See generally FONER, supra note 104; THOMAS HOLT, BLACK OVER WHITE: 
NEGRO PoLmCAL LEADERSHIP IN Sourn CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1977); 
LmVACK, supra note 134; Michael Fitzgerald, "To Give Our Vote to the Party": Black Po­
litical Agitation and Agricultural Change in Alabama, 1865-1870, 76 J. AM. HIST. 489 
(1989); Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and Re­
construction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863 (1987). 
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When Congress made plain its refusal to redistribute the estates of 
the South, the key sites of argument and struggle shifted to the hustings, 
legislatures, local courthouses, churches, and fields of the region. State 
and local Black Republican leaders formed coalitions with representa­
tives of white yeomen and tenant farmers to build up a Southern base 
for the "party of Free Labor."140 Meanwhile, "Black Republican" jud­
ges and justices of the peace adjudicated contract disputes between free­
dmen and former masters in a fashion that confirmed the planters' worst 
fears about "Negro rule" and confirmed as well the mutability and re­
distributive potential of common law doctrine. "Equal rights under 
law" was anything but self-defining; as is often the case in contract and 
property relations, the devil was in the details and who controlled 
them.141 Called on to elaborate and apply the principles of property and 
free contract to the emergent relations between landlord and share­
cropper, Black Republican judges did so in ways that gave the latter a 
substantial measure of bargaining power and control over work and 
crop. No jurist ever plumbed more deeply the meaning of the individ­
ual's "right to the fruits of his labor."142 As "Black Republican" judges 
granted more power to sharecroppers, and "Black Republican" law­
makers enacted redistributive taxes, lien laws, and land-lease measures, 
the planter class and the Democratic Party turned to massive violence 
and economic coercion to quell black voting and political associations. 
The Democrats and the Klan also meted out violence against black 
property holders and skilled craftsmen, aiming, in one freedman's 
words, to "[keep us] as the hewers of wood and drawers of water to as 
mean a class of white men . . .  as live in any one of these reconstructed 
states."143 
4. The Distributive Ideal and the Architects of the Laissez-Faire 
Constitution 
By 1874, Northern weariness with Reconstruction and readiness to 
"leave the South alone" enabled the Democrats to regain control of 
140. With the goal of broadening the distribution of property and creating a large class of 
viable freeholders, several of these so-called "Black Republican" state parties succeeded, for a 
brief season, in passing redistributive taxes, lien laws, and land·lease measures, and in creating 
the South's first public education systems. See FONER, supra note 104, at 281-411. 
141. See HOLT, supra note 139; EDWARD MAGDOL, A RIGHT TO THE LAND: EsSAYS ON 
THE FREEDMEN'S CoMMUNITY (1977); DONALD NIEMAN, To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE 
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS 1865-1868 (1979); Donald 
Nieman, African Americans and the Meaning of Freedom: Washington County, Texas as a Case 
Study, 1865-1890, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 541 (1994); Donald Nieman, Black Political Power 
and Criminal Justice: Washington County, Texas, 1868-1884, 55 J. S. HIST. 391 (1989) 
[hereinafter Nieman, Black Political Power]. 
142 See Nieman, Black Political Power, supra note 141. 
143. PETER J. RACHLEFF, BLACK LABOR IN THE Sourn: RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1865-
1890, at 65 (1984). 
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Congress. Southern Blacks continued to vote and form political 
associations for virtually two decades after Reconstruction, but all three 
branches of the national government began dismantling federal 
protections for the freed people's recently enacted rights. From the 
mid-1870s onward, racial backlash in the South and intensifying class 
strife and agrarian unrest in the North and Midwest drove Republican 
leaders to remake the party into a bastion of laissez-faire. 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, Radical Republicans like 
the leading Radical journalist and opinion maker, Edwin Godkin, editor 
of the Nation, had told labor audiences that a government "of and from 
the people . . .  cannot destroy its (or their) liberties." But by the early 
'70s, Godkin and other Radical publicists were growing appalled to hear 
the vaunted language of popular sovereignty and active democratic 
government appropriated by labor agitators calling for such things as 
the demise of "property rights rulership. "144 
During the early years of Reconstruction, Godkin's sympathetic 
but ambivalent analysis of the wage laborer's predicament still rested 
on a traditional republican outlook and, in significant ways, resembled 
the labor movement's own assessment. The industrial laborer, he 
wrote in '67, "is legally free while socially bound"; "since the rise of 
political economy," he "has been treated [in books] as the equal of the 
capitalist . . .  but in real life his position has been that of a servant with 
a fixed status." He cannot "assume in practice the position [of a free 
agent] which the political economists have persistently assigned to 
him."145 Godkin agreed with labor's tribunes that this system of social 
bondage undermined workers' capacities as citizens: "When a man 
agrees to sell his labor, he agrees by implication to surrender his social 
and political independence." Widespread "diffusion" of ownership of 
productive property was essential to a "virtuous" - "independent," 
"self-reliant," "frugal," and "intelligent" - citizenry and a nation's lib­
erty.146 The remedy to labor's "servile dependence" on capital, Godkin 
also agreed, lay in cooperative ownership of industry. He chided the la­
bor movement for trying to enlist the state in its efforts to gain a greater 
144. McNeill, supra note 119; see also S. JOHNSON, LABOR PARTIES AND LABOR 
REFORM 14-16 (1871). 
Even the nationally prominent labor journalist John Swinton was turning the concept in 
perilous directions. "[T]he great feature of the public life of this country," Swinton declared 
in a widely reprinted Fourth of July oration, and "one which our industrial classes have 
seemed to be entirely unaware of," lies in the fact that "all power over all things is given to 
the people, over even laws, and possessions, and pretensions, and institutions, and shams!" 
JOHN SWINTON, STRIKING FOR LIFE: LABOR'S SIDE OF THE LABOR QUESTION 335 (1894). 
Here was an appeal to "intensely democratic instincts" and an attempt to educate the de­
sires of the "industrial classes" in just the direction which so distressed middle-class Radi­
cals and reformers. See E.L. Godkin, Labor and Politics, 24 NATION 386, 387 (1872). 
145. E.L. Godkin, The Labor Crisis, 105 N. AM. REv. 177, 184, 188-89 (1867). 
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share of the "results of labor," but he vigorously defended workers' 
right to organize and strike for that end. And he enjoined workers to 
"never cease agitating and combining until the regime of wages . . .  has 
passed away," and all "the great accumulations of capital are held by 
[labor] associations. "147 
By 1872, Godkin had already had enough of labor's combining and 
agitating. Alarmed by the massive eight-hour day strikes which were 
sweeping New York and other industrial cities, he undertook to 
enlighten "the working-class mind." Previously hoping for the abolition 
of the wage system, now he chastened workingmen for seeking to 
prevent capital from getting into the hands of the only class in the 
community that is competent to use it.148 Above all, Godkin was 
outraged by the New York labor movement's successful campaign for 
an eight-hour day ordinance covering municipal contracts and 
employment, and by their demand for a general eight-hour law. 
Instead, Godkin declared that the "reward of labor" ought to depend 
"on the cost of material and transportation or on demand and 
supply."149 
As disturbing as labor's new politics to the "best people" of the 
North, like Godkin, were other contemporaneous signs of "runaway 
democracy," like the Granger agitation.150 The disenchantment \vith 
federal intervention and "Black Republicanism" in the South that ran 
through the pages of Godkin's Nation, the Atlantic Monthly, and the 
North American Review was closely bound up with a desire to curb the 
extreme phase of republicanism and the clamor for class legislation 
which seemed rife at home in the industrializing North.151 
In the 1860s the editors and contributors to these journals had 
helped etch out a theory of an active, democratic state which lent le­
gitimacy and coherence to the expanded powers of the federal govern­
ment and the project of Radical Reconstruction. Now many of the 
same thinkers and spokesmen coalesced into a new movement which 
gained adherents among prominent Northern lawyers, businessmen, 
and academics, many of them former Radicals and abolitionists. It 
styled itself "Liberalism" - appropriately enough, since its thinking 
represented an unraveling of Lincolnian "Free Labor" ideology, dis­
carding many of its democratic strands and fortifying its liberal ones.152 
147. Id. at 197, 213. 
148. Godkin, supra note 144, at 386. 
149. Id. 
150. See HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 347-66 (1973); JOHN G. 
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361. 
152. The best account remains SPROAT, supra note 150. See also FONER, supra note 79, 
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Although they were anxiously renouncing one activist democratic 
outlook, many new liberals could feel they were returning to another, 
older democratic reform tradition: The first expressions of laissez-faire 
doctrine, the first systematic protests against state activism in America 
arose from the Jacksonian campaigns against national bank and state 
corporate charters, against government-created "monopolies" that 
subordinated the many to the few.153 Many of the new liberals had 
been Jacksonians, even radical Jacksonians in their youths.154 Now, 
ironically, they transformed the Jacksonian vocabulary into a defense 
of the few against the many. The new liberalism was, as David Mont­
gomery and others have dubbed it, an "elitist reform movement." 155 
But if they assailed labor's experimenting with the uses of state power, 
the new liberals often were no less alarmed by capitalists seeking 
"state favors," their "abuses of the taxing power," their clamoring for 
"tariff schemes, subsidy schemes, internal improvement schemes." 
The "aggrandizement of capital by law," they warned, was the "par­
ent" and inspiration of labor's "socialism."156 Not only capital's state 
subsidies but the unprecedented power of the emerging large corpora­
tion itself troubled these men. The common law was replete with doc­
trine and ideology hostile to corporate expansion and would remain 
so under the sway of the first generation of laissez-faire or new liberal 
jurists.157 
To be ambivalent about corporations' effects on individual free­
dom, free markets, and republican government was no more than to 
remain alive to the classical liberal view on corporations158 and to the 
Jacksonian antimonopoly tradition from which so many new liberals 
sprang. Perhaps none felt this ambivalence in more pointed ways than 
the significant number of new liberal reformers who, like Justice 
Field's brother David Dudley Field, were also corporate attorneys. 
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As Robert Gordon has shown, men like Field were on one hand ex­
ponents of liberal "Legal Science" and "Reform" extolling a legal or­
der that protected a free and competitive marketplace, equal rights 
and equal opportunities; in this role, they saw themselves striving to 
release law and government from the grip of "class interests." On the 
other hand, as leading attorneys for the new corporations, they were 
implicated in their clients' purchasing of judges and legislators and, 
more importantly, they were successfully undercutting and supplant­
ing the very legal concepts and doctrines that sought to keep corpora­
tions within the framework of competitive individualism their liberal 
legal reform ideology prized.159 They were at once foes and agents of 
the "aggrandizement of capital by law." 
Thus, Field fretted in the pages of the North American Review, 
"[w]e have created a new class of beings . . .  [and] individuals find 
themselves powerless before these aggregations of wealth . . .  [for] we 
have neglected to fence them about with . . .  restraints."160 How to re­
store the equality that "we" negligently have destroyed? How to 
bridge the ever more distant and antagonistic relations between capi­
tal and labor? Field's answer was to call on fellow members of the 
new corporate elite to appropriate the co-operative impulse among 
labor and agrarian reformers, to turn corporations from associations 
"of capital only" into associations "of capital and labor united."161 
Like Godkin fifteen years earlier, Field beheld the labor upheavals of 
the mid-1880s and responded with anxious concern to wage-earners' 
protest that capital had reduced them to a "relation of dependence . . .  
incompatible with that sense of self-respect . . .  that should be the pat­
rimony of every American citizen."162 He did not share Godkin's early 
sympathy with strictly worker-owned businesses; rather, he hoped that 
profit-sharing and granting workers certain voting rights in the corpo­
ration would restore equality and respect between labor and capital. 
Of course, like Godkin, Field held that accomplishing these desirable 
reforms could not be the business of government. That was the 
"dream of madmen" and would violate "the Supreme Law."163 
Henry George was among the Gilded Age's leading radicals, just 
as Field was among its leading liberal reformers.164 Author of Prog­
ress and Poverty and labor party candidate for mayor of New York in 
159. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Prac­
tices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST­
CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 {Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). 
160. See David D. Field, Industrial Cooperation, 140 N. AM. REV. 411, 412 {1885). 
161. Id. at 414. 
162. Id. at 418. 
163. Id. at 416. 
164. See JOHN L. THOMAS, ALTERNATIVE AMERICA: HENRY GEORGE, EDWARD 
BELLAMY, HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, AND THE ADVERSARY TRADmoN {1983). 
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the remarkable election of 1884,165 George questioned Field's reliance 
on corporate officials' good will to reform industry. Listening to Field 
expound on the proper limits of government in a revealing public de­
bate, George emphasized that "all [his] earlier thought [like Field's] 
was in the direction . . .  [of the] Democratic Party of the last genera­
tion [i.e., the Jacksonians]." He had only concluded reluctantly that 
achieving Field's and the liberals' ends demanded abandoning their 
conception of appropriate means. Securing "the full and equal liberty 
of individuals" and mutual cooperation in an age of "great corpora­
tions and combinations" might require that government "regulate" or 
"carry on" certain businesses and "in larger and larger degree assume 
co-operative functions."166 Sternly, Field replied that although he did 
not believe George to be "one of the Communists," he thought his 
ideas might entail "spoliation . . .  tak[ing] from one man his property 
and giv[ing] it to another."167 
The prominence of elite attorneys in new liberal circles and the 
emerging ideology's antimajoritarian bent help explain why in 
government the new liberalism won most support in the judiciary. 
Indeed, as David Montgomery has noted, "the first systematic 
exposition of the new liberalism was an essay on the Constitution."168 
In 1868, Thomas M. Cooley, then chief justice of the Supreme Court 
of Michigan, published A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 
Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the Union.169 
Cooley's Treatise would go through four editions in the next ten years 
and enjoy greater sales and circulation and more frequent citation 
than any other treatise of the latter half of the nineteenth centuryY0 
165. See David Scobey, Boycotting the Politics Factory: Labor Radicalism and the New 
York City Mayoral Election o/1884, 28-30 RADICAL HIST. REV. 280 (1984). 
166. David D. Field & Henry George, Land and Taxation: A Conversation, 141 N. AM. 
REV. 1, 9 (1885). 
167. ld. at 10. 
168. MONfGOMERY, supra note 152, at 380. 
169. Cooley's political odyssey was richly typical: a radical Jacksonian reformer in his 
youth; an abolitionist; a Free Soil Party organizer; a Republican Party founder who broke 
with the Republicans during Grant's administration; and finally an independent "Mug­
wump," or new liberal reformer and jurist. Like Justice Field's, Cooley's judicial opinions 
exemplify the highly abstract yet deeply felt fusion of Abolitionist and laissez-faire mean­
ings of "discrimination by the state." He assailed "class legislation" in all its (to him basi­
cally identical and equally invidious) forms. Compare People v. Board of Education of De­
troit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869) (denying Board's authority to segregate schools by race), with 
People ex rel Detroit and Howell Railroad Co. v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 487 
(1870) (township may not use tax power to float bonds to subsidize private enterprise). 
Likewise, Cooley's Treatise treated as "discriminatory class legislation" hours laws on be­
half of various categories of workers. For thoughtful assessments, see HOWARD GILLMAN, 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993), and Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez­
Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751 (1967). 
170. On the influence of Cooley's treatise in addition to Ambiguities, see CLYDE E. 
JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
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In it he wrote that the "sacred right" to private property stood as "the 
old fundamental law" prior to the Constitution, and through it 
popular sovereignty was limited. Neither directly nor indirectly could 
legislatures "take property from one person and transfer it to 
another."171 With Justice Field's banner of "free labor" in one hand 
and Cooley's Treatise in the other, industrialists and their attorneys 
would soon proceed to court, contending that "property" implied 
capital and that "liberty" implied free contract and a free market in 
labor. 
For his part, Cooley was ambivalent. As labor's political demands 
and initiatives grew more insistent, and the first crop of trial court de­
cisions appeared, striking down several of labor's hard-won reforms,172 
Cooley authored a revealing jeremiad. Having done more than any­
one to craft the emerging laissez-faire Constitution, Cooley urged the 
employer not to stand upon his constitutional right "to control his 
business in his own way . . .  [and] to make his own contracts."173 Mor­
ally, he argued, the employer's business "is as much that of those who 
bring to it [their] labor"; moreover, their poverty was "not likely to 
impress [workers'] minds with the conviction that the business is ex­
clusively . . .  their employers'."174 Unless employers voluntarily shared 
their "control," labor would continue enlisting behind "radically mis­
chievous" labor legislation. The courts would be obliged to void the 
reforms, and the outcome would be that "the Constitution itself may 
come to be regarded by considerable classes as an instrument whose 
office is to protect the rich . . . .  "175 Of course, the prophecy proved 
only half true. While labor continued to press for legislation struck 
down by the courts, it did not come to hate "the Constitution itself" 
but to condemn the new liberals' Constitution as counterfeit. 
Christopher Tiedman's contribution to laissez-faire constitution­
alism was second only to Cooley's. His A Treatise on the Limitations 
of the Police Power in the United States was first published in 1886;176 
over the next several decades, it was cited in "well over 400 opinions 
LAW (1954), and BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ­
FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (1942). 
171. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REsT UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
356-57 (5th ed., 1883). 
172. See FORBATH, supra note 88. 
173. Thomas M. Cooley, Labor and Capital Before the Law, 139 N. AM. REV. 503, 511 
(1884). 
174. COOLEY, supra note 171, at 512-14. 
175. Id. at 514. 
176. The Treatise was released in a revised two-volume edition in 1900. See CHRIS­
TOPHER G. 'TIEDEMAN, A 'TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1900). 
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of the highest courts of the states."177 Imbued with the dark fears 
spawned by the Haymarket bombing, Tiedman's Preface to the 1886 
edition of his Treatise has cemented his reactionary reputation. "So­
cialism, Communism, and Anarchism," he wrote, "are rampant 
throughout the civilized world."178 Far more stringently than Cooley, 
Tiedman in his Treatise set about protecting private rights against this 
new "unreasoning" "absolutism" of a democratic majority by confin­
ing the exercise of state power to "the detailed enforcement of the le­
gal maxim, which enunciates the fundamental rule of both the human 
and the natural law, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas."119 
The Treatise may fairly be called reactionary, but not in the sense 
that the progressive historiography has depicted it. The main burden 
of Tiedman's constitutional political economy is not a defense of the 
emerging corporate elite, but, as Louise Halper has shown, the 
restoration of an idealized antebellum economy of small holders. The 
main foes are not only Socialism and Communism but equally the 
"giant combinations of capital" that threatened to drive "the small 
tradesman, manufacturer and artisan [the exemplars of Free 
Labor] . . .  to the wall."180 Here we see the fierce individualism of the 
laissez-faire Constitution with its egalitarian aspect still intact. For 
Tiedman, no less than for the era's famous reformers like Henry 
George or the Populists we are about to study, economic 
concentration, the incorporation of America, came to seem the most 
dire threat to the Constitution's promise of equal citizenship - and to 
that bond between equal rights and equal opportunity at the heart of 
the laissez-faire Constitution. 
A careful reading of the Treatise reveals that Tiedman always had 
contended that the limitations of the police power he set forth 
"only . . .  applied to the regulation of small business, what he called 
'trades and professions.' " 181 As for corporations, their "rights and 
powers . . .  depend altogether upon the will of the legislature."182 
More than that, Tiedman came to agree with the Populists that the 
177. Louise A. Halper, Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism' and 
the Dilemmas of Small-Scale Property in the Gilded Age, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 1349, 1352 
(1990). 
178. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES at vi (1886). "Contemplating . . .  the great army of discon­
tents," the Preface continues, "and their apparent power, with the growth and development 
of universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the con­
servative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and 
more unreasoning than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic 
majority." Id. at vii. 
179. Id. at vii. 
180. Halper, supra note 177, at 1356. 
181. Id. at 1368. 
182. TIEDEMAN, supra note 178, at 354. 
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Constitution's pledge of equal rights demanded "the conversion of all 
of these necessary monopolies [railroads, communications, public 
utilities] into government monopolies."18 3 The "creation of such pri­
vate monopolies [through incorporation and grants of eminent do­
main and other powers]," Tiedman argued in the pages of the Har­
vard Law Review, was a "patent and unmistakable violation of our 
constitutional guaranty of equal privileges and immunities."18 4 But the 
constitutional infirmity of the giant corporation was not limited to 
railroads and utilities; by the Treatise's final edition, Tiedman had 
concluded that general incorporation statutes themselves trenched on 
"the constitutional guarantee of equality,"18 5 because they constituted 
state action essential to the very existence of the equality-destroying 
concentrations of wealth and power all across the economic land­
scape. Tiedman's laissez-faire Constitution, in other words, came to 
command restoration of older forms of proprietorship. If a business, 
like banking or insurance, "cannot be successfully conducted by natu­
ral persons without the aid of incorporation, the only method of pro­
viding for such businesses, which is consonant with the democratic 
principles of equality, is by their conversion into government mo­
nopolies." 186 
Few proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism followed Tied­
man down the heterodox path of government ownership and petty 
proprietorship, but as we have seen, a surprising number of his fellow 
liberals, like Cooley and David Dudley Field, shared Tiedman's fear 
that the corporate order, which they helped fashion and protect, did 
violence to the republican Constitution. Cooley, Field, and many 
other high-minded new liberal reformers embraced the idea of coop­
erative ownership of the tools of industry as a way of rebuilding the 
material foundations of equal citizenship - the modern equivalent of 
broadly distributed yeoman property. Of course, as "new liberals," 
most elite reformers could not abide the use of legislation to help bring 
about such reforms. Instead, they exhorted captains of industry to ad­
dress the widening gulf between labor and capital. 187 But these plead­
ings produced more expiation than reform, and it fell to Gilded Age 
radicals to imagine a new and pragmatic political economy of citizenship 
and write the first serious chapter on the significance for an industrial­
ized America of the distributive and enabling dimensions of the Consti­
tution's promise of equal rights. 
183. Christopher G. Tiedman, Government Ownership of Public Utilities, 16 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 483 (1903). 
184. Id. at 481. 
185. 1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL 
OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 609-10 (1900). 
186. Id. at 610. 
187. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 171, at 511-15; Field, supra note 160, at 412-420 (1885). 
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5. Populism and the Social Meaning of Equal Rights 
Populism and the People's Party marked an effort to rebuild a "poor 
man's party" akin to the southern Republicans' on new foundations. 
Not since the abolitionists had reformers plunged so deeply into consti­
tutional discourse. Throughout the 1890s, Populists produced scores of 
books and entire weekly and monthly journals whose densely argued 
pages melded constitutional, political-economic, and sociological argu­
ments, calling for the democratization of a range of national institutions: 
the banking and currency systems, corporations law, railroad regulation, 
industrial relations, and the constitutional framework itself. The Popu­
lists' account of constitutional crisis was two-fold. "Equal rights" and 
the very standing of farmers and working people as citizens were in 
jeopardy because of corporate power, and so too was popular sover­
eignty; corporate power had combined with an overweening judiciary 
and corrupt party system to shatter the sovereign people's control of the 
state and federal governments that were meant to carry out their will. 
Like their labor-reform counterparts, Populists held that the "doc­
trine of equality" was "not limited to a dogma that all men should be 
made equal before the law."188 The "real theory" of constitutional 
equality was this. "[I]n our Constitution the principle is imbedded" of 
securing "the widest distribution among the people, not only of political 
power, but of the advantages of wealth, education, and social influ­
ence." Only thus could the Nation "maintain the practical equality of all 
the people."189 This idea of "equal rights," he insisted, echoing the 
Slaughter-House dissenters, was "the great basic idea of our laws, the 
very comer-stone of the republican structure."190 And that structure 
was at risk. Corporations had arrogated to themselves the tools of in­
dustry, transportation, communication, and finance. Concentrating 
"egregious wealth in the hands of the few at the cost of creating a pro­
portionate poverty among the many," corporations wielded their power 
to destroy the "democratic social fabric." This "departure from the 
fundamental intent and purpose of our republican system," however, 
was no sign of the "failure of the constitution," but of the "failure of this 
Nation to enforce" it.191 
188. Jas. F. Hudson, Railways: Their Uses and Abuses, and Their Effect Upon Republi­
can Institutions and Protective Industries, NAT'LECONOMIST, May 11, 1889, at 113. 
189. Id. at 113, 114. 
190. Jas. F. Hudson, Railways: Their Uses and Abuses, and their Effect Upon Republican 
Institutions and Productive Industries, No. 2, NAT'LECONOMIST, May 18, 1889, at 137. 
191. Id. See also Some Questions Answered, NAT'L ECONOMIST, June 22, 1889, at 214-
15 (arguing that corporate monopolies on "any field of labor" abridged the equal rights of citi­
zens and were "consequently unconstitutional"); G. Campbell, The Early History of the 
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a. Republican Congressmen and Populists Compared 
The claim that the rise of the large-scale corporation marked a con­
stitutional crisis was mooted inside Congress as well. Like the agrarian 
radicals, Senator Sherman claimed that the concentration of power in 
the new corporations was "fast producing [a] condition in our people in 
which the great mass of them are the servitors of those who have this 
aggregated wealth at their command."192 Justice Field's "right of free 
labor" echoed here as well: "It is the right of every man to work, labor, 
and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on 
equal terms . . . . This is industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of 
the equality of all rights and privileges."193 Because corporate combina­
tions were destroying the "industrial liberty of the citizens," Congress 
was obliged to act.194 
Of course, finding that Sherman shared this language of constitu­
tional politics in common with the era's radicals is not to imply their 
remedies for the crisis were the same. Sherman hoped to reinvigorate 
the distributive ideal of broadly diffused property through rigorous ap­
plication of restraint of trade doctrine. He had no sympathy for the 
Populists' claim that "industrial liberty" and the "right of free labor" 
demanded nationalizing the railroads and dismantling centralized pri­
vate banking, nor for their labor planks of the eight-hour day and an 
end to the labor injunction.195 Sherman had a much more generous view 
than the Court of Congress's authority to protect "industrial liberty."196 
But with the Court, Republican moderates like Sherman hewed to the 
central tenets of late-nineteenth-century liberal and liberal-legal ortho­
doxy - its commitment to a neutral, nonredistributive state and a neu­
tral, self-regulating market order. They saw the giant trusts and combi­
nations as both unnatural and illegitimate. At the same time, however, 
they saw the "essential rights and privileges" conferred by corporate 
charters as property rights, which could not be taken "under pretence of 
regulation" or in the name of redistributing economic power.197 
192. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 {1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman). 
193. Id. at2457. 
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The constitutional dimensions of the antitrust crusade also loomed large in state court­
houses and legislatures. State constitutions often contained detailed antitrust provisions, 
which lawmakers and state attorneys linked to more general guarantees of "equal rights." 
Thus, for example, in a quo warranto suit against the Chicago Gas Trust Company, Illinois's 
attorney general argued that the state's corporation law did not authorize defendant's 
holding stock in and thereby thwarting competition among the city's several gas companies. 
He defended his interpretation of the general incorporation statute by invoking the state's 
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The Populists, for their part, melded an older theory of the corpora­
tion - that it was an artificial creature whose rights could be extin­
guished when it ceased to perform a public function198 - with a new 
concept of Congress's affirmative duties to regulate the economy for the 
"general welfare" that would bear fruit in the New Dealers' "general 
welfare Constitution" decades later. They accused the courts of cor­
rupting both the Constitution and the common law by eroding the 
common law's many constraints on corporate expansion and endowing 
corporations with personhood and property rights that stymied regula­
tion.199 Moreover, as we will see, Populists argued that corporations 
were being allowed and even authorized to usurp powers the Constitu­
tion assigned to Congress and forbade to these new private actors. 
Combination, Populists acknowledged, was an element of the age; it 
was "irresistible."200 The New York Sun was not wrong when it an­
nounced that "these hayseed socialists" were "disposed to make the ex­
periment of consolidating their interests [through large-scale coopera­
tion underwritten by public credit] after the fashion which they so 
bitterly denounce in the case of manufacturing [corporations and 
trusts]."201 But, while corporate lawyers argued for the unique efficiency 
of corporate consolidations, Populists argued that there was no natural 
Constitution. "To create one corporation for the express purpose of enabling it to control 
all the corporations engaged in a certain kind of business . . .  is in contravention of the spirit, 
if not the letter of the constitution" - the spirit of its "equal rights" provisions and the let­
ter of its antitrust norms. See 1890 ILL. ATI'Y GEN. BIENNIEL REP. 40. Whether one turns 
to the legislative committee that authored New York's stringent 1897 antitrust measures, or 
to Missouri's celebrated 1905 antitrust suit against Standard Oil - both chronicled in James 
May's important work on state-level antitrust history - one finds the same doctrine of con­
stitutional political economy, knitting "political liberty" and industrial freedom, "equal 
rights" and "equal opportunities." See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political 
and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 
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path for combination to follow, no natural laws dictating the course of 
commercial and economic development. Populist journalists like Henry 
Demarest Lloyd proved keen observers of corporate consolidation in 
the nation's courts and shrewd critics of claims that the modifications of 
the doctrine attorneys sought and judges granted were dictated by tech­
nical imperatives and economic laws. Rather, Lloyd argued, the legal 
and organizational changes championed by corporate consolidators 
were driven by the latter's particular group interests. In some cases, the 
changes worked to provide economies of scale and consumer savings. 
In other cases, they only profited the consolidators who fashioned them; 
but never were they the only efficient avenues of industrial change, and 
other workable alternatives promised more - materially and morally 
- for the broader citizenry. 202 
Another leading Populist lecturer explained that "the development 
of corporations under our changing laws has created especial advan­
tages for the accumulation of property in the hands of a favored class . . .  
and increased the[ir] political and social power." Yet, the very purpose 
of "inscribing in the Constitution the principle of equality" was "to se­
cure a general diffusion of wealth and to maintain the practical equality 
of all the people."203 Thus, it was "vital[ly] necess[ary to] discover[] ex­
actly where and how the constitutional principle was violated, and re­
stor[ e] the supremacy of republican doctrine."204 As federal courts 
struck down popular state railroad regulatory commissions and statu­
tory controls on "the exactions of our own domestic corporations," 
Populists like Oregon governor Sylvester Pennoyer complained of one 
such violation of the "republican" Constitution: the "monstrous doc­
trine" that "sovereignty can be peddled out to corporations and frit­
tered away."205 In Congress, Populist Senator Kenna explained that 
202. See HENRY D. LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 285-312, 420-30 {1894) 
(using case studies to argue that various forms of ownership and control of large-scale industry 
equally possible and municipal ownership of utilities more efficient from consumers' perspec­
tive than private ownership; similarly comparing efficiency of giant corporation versus smaller­
scale oil producer). See also GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF 
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formers, including Thomas Cooley as first head of the Interstate Commerce Commission, ver­
sus a nationalizing "corporate liberal" strategy promoted by the corporate elite, Republican 
politicians, and most of the federal bench. Along with contemporaries like Lloyd, Berk argues 
that the outcome of the contests was determined largely not by technology or economic effi­
ciency so much as by law and politics. Berk highlights the role of federal fiscal policy and of 
judicial decisions changing the ground rules of corporations law to favor large-scale corporate 
consolidators 
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railroad regulation "was a reassumption by Congress of a power to 
regulate interstate commerce which the Constitution confers upon Con­
gress, and which the railroads have usurped and absorbed." "Govern­
ment cannot surrender," he explained, in terms Thomas Jefferson's 
friend Judge Roane of the Virginia Supreme Court would have under­
stood,206 "the subordination of its own creations to public purposes."207 
Populist presidential candidate Weaver generalized the point. With the 
rise of the "trusts," key functions of government - regulating interstate 
commerce and transportation, issuing and controlling currency - had 
been given over to private corporations and "leased to associated 
speculators." These were constitutional usurpations. Not only did the 
Constitution authorize Congress to perform these functions, but when 
otherwise Congress's powers were exercised by private actors in a fash­
ion that violated the common good - dispossessing farmers and re­
ducing wage earners to industrial slavery - it was "the Constitutional 
duty of Congress" to act.208 
"Cyclone" Davis, one of Texas Populism's favorite orators, 
authored a book-length constitutional indictment of corporate "usur­
pation," a "communism of capital . . . unknown to our Constitu­
tion."209 Often carrying a dozen volumes of Jefferson to the podium, 
Davis, like many Southern Populists, struggled to reconcile an inher­
ited strict constructionism with Populism's vision of the uses of na­
tional power. Davis returned to the founding era to recover for leery 
Southerners the nationalizing thrust of the framers' political-economic 
outlook. In Madison's Papers he found the report of the 1786 Anna­
polis convention highlighting the need for a new national " 'power of 
regulating trade . . .  of such comprehensive extent . . .  that to give it ef­
ficacy . . .  may require a correspondent adjustment of other parts of 
the Federal system.' " "As James Madison and Thomas Jefferson tell 
us, the old Federal government was insufficient . . .  and when a Na­
tional convention met[,] . . .  they found [their task was] impossible . . .  
without giving the government more power, a power . . .  to act directly 
on the people and not through the States." Turning to constitutional 
text, Davis abjured the idea "that Congress can do anything and eve­
rything it chooses to think would secure the purposes named in the 
noyer]; see also Harry Tracey, Some Questions About "Vested Rights" Answered, NAT'L 
ECONOMIST, June 22, 1891, at 214-15. Law students today are familiar with an earlier unhappy 
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[P]reamble . . . .  "210 Congress must, however, exercise its enumerated 
powers to fulfill the Preamble's purposes. Instead, Davis charged, in 
its exercise of the commerce power - "this power that served as the 
mainspring to build up our government . . .  and gave birth to this Con­
stitution"211 - Congress has scorned the general welfare. "Congress 
allows, yea even charters, licenses a lot of cold, faithless, soulless, 
heartless, merciless corporations, to stand between the government 
and the people, and usurp the blessings conferred by this power, 
forcing the people to look to these conscienceless beings for money 
and transportation to carry on their commerce."212 Allowing "mo­
nopoly in the . . .  distribution of money" and "monopoly in transporta­
tion" fostered "monopoly in the distribution of wealth"; so doing 
Congress had abandoned the general welfare and destroyed equality 
before the law.213 Threading his way through text and history to 
precedent, Davis conjured with the spirit of Jefferson's nemesis, 
lending Marshall's famous invocation of a national People a Populist 
punch: "[I]n every one of these powers . . .  it is the duty of Congress to 
act directly on the people and for the people . . . not through the 
States . . .  much less through corporations or syndicates. "214 "[I]n every 
power [the United States] is a Nation and is expected to act through 
its own officers, and must . . .  act directly on the people. To 'farm out' 
or delegate its powers" by authorizing virtually unfettered corporate 
control of the lines of commerce and finance and the world of industry 
was to betray the Constitution.215 
Of course, implementing the Populists' "positive" Constitution de­
manded amending the Constitution to "free [it] from the courts." Ap­
propriately enough, agrarian and labor Antimonopolists decried the ju­
diciary's "asserted Monopoly on interpreting the Constitution," for 
which "no warrant can be found in the Constitution itself." By amend­
ing the Constitution, they sought to reclaim the "Power of the Co­
Ordinate Branches and of the Sovereign People to render their own In­
terpretations."216 The constitutional amendments they championed to 
"tame" the judiciary and to restore popular sovereignty included elec­
tion of federal and state judges; abolition or curtailment of judicial re­
view of various classes of reform statutes; direct election of senators; 
210. Id. at 70. 
211. Id. at 72. 
212. Id. at 73. 
213. Id. at 15. 
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and provisions for the initiative, referendum, and recall in state constitu­
tions.217 Then, they could set about lawmaking to restore and renew 
farmers' and workers' citizenship rights. Substantively, this meant 
freeing the "colored laborer with the white" one from the "iron rule of 
the Money power" through public credit and support for cooperative 
enterprise; it meant nationalizing the railways; it meant ensuring for in­
dustrial workers the "right to a remunerative job" through public works 
and countercyclical spending and, through an end to the repressive 
common law restraints on workers' collective action and the savagery of 
"government by injunction," encouraging robust unions and industrial 
cooperation; and through these agencies, finally, it meant enabling 
workers to exercise the rights and responsibilities of control over pro­
ductive property.218 
Thus, Gilded Age labor and agrarian spokespeople rejected the 
courts' view that constitutional liberties were only "negative." Theirs 
was a "positive" constitutional order, although they envisioned not wel­
fare entitlements, but a "Reconstructed" political economy as the vehi­
cle for securing the constitutional norms of decent livelihoods, inde­
pendence, responsibility, and dignifying work. 
b. African Americans: Populism and After 
Southern blacks continued to vote and form political associations for 
virtually two decades after Reconstruction. The rights talk of the 
Gilded Age black labor and agrarian reformers "wove together the 
rhetoric of 'equal rights' and 'race pride.' "219 They continued to rage 
against Klan violence and forcible exclusion from skilled callings, but 
they also struck more expansive chords, drawing out the links between 
the labor-populist reform program and their Reconstruction-bred un­
derstanding of equal citizenship: a decent living and with it, dignity, 
autonomy, and equal standing in civil society and polity, secured by 
something beyond formal equality - enabling rights and resources, ac­
cessible land and credit, and new forms of civic association linking mar­
ket and polity.220 
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Another concerted wave of terror, violence, and massive disen­
franchisement, unopposed by federal authority, stilled these voices. By 
the turn of the century, the very words "equality" and "equal rights" 
appeared less and less in the Black press, and the most insistent claim 
for equal protection of the laws was no longer against discrimination in 
credit, schooling, street cars, or public accommodations. It was against 
the denial of bare physical protection from the lynch mob, white vio­
lence, and a rule of terror condoned by local and state officialdom.221 
Waving the banner of white solidarity, the "Redeemers" yoked their 
campaign of fraud and violence against black voting to an ideological 
campaign against the fragile inter-racial alliance at the heart of southern 
Populism. By century's end, southern Populism's white leaders and 
constituents had largely succumbed. The People's Party lived on into 
the 1900s, lapsing into vile racism and supporting an end to African 
American suffrage. The Georgia Populist Congressman Tom Watson, 
who had stood firm against armed lynch mobs in the name of interracial 
solidarity and black suffrage, bitterly concluded that agrarian reform 
demanded black disenfranchisement: southern whites couldn't divide 
along class lines until they united against blacks. 
The campaign to "redeem" the South into which a jaundiced, race­
baited Watson enlisted was an elite-led affair, prompted by the threat of 
a poor people's party that joined tenants, sharecroppers, and mine and 
mill workers on both sides of the color line. The Redeemers did not 
disenfranchise poor blacks alone; to defuse Populism, they also aimed to 
strip the vote from lower class whites, and they succeeded handsomely. 
The poll tax proved a defining feature of the Jim Crow order forged 
around the turn of the century, and in many southern states far more 
whites than blacks - a majority of white voters - were barred from the 
ballot box by the tax. Combined with the all-white primary and racial 
intimidation, which took precedence in blocking black voter participa­
tion, the poll tax would operate during the New Deal era to deprive lib­
eral Democrats of their natural constituency among hard-hit southern­
ers of both races. Meanwhile, the codification of white supremacy and 
widespread disenfranchisement secured a closed, one-party system 
dominated by the landholding elites of the Black Belt and by New 
South entrepreneurs and industrialists, two groups joined in their de­
termination to preserve a labor force that was poorly educated, racially 
divided, and "schooled in dependency."222 
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The U.S. Supreme Court played an important part in this process, 
almost strangling the Equal Protection Clause in its infancy, striking 
down or narrowly reading various civil rights acts, and confirming that 
the constitutional guarantees of Black citizenship would not impede Jim 
Crow, Klan violence, and mass disenfranchisement through the poll tax 
and other devices.223 The Court thus lent its sanction to the reconsti­
tuted caste system of the South; and the New South thereby secured its 
special status as a distinct society within the Union's new constitutional 
order. The Court's bad faith, shared by the other branches, led to a fa­
tal anomaly in the constitutional revolution we are about to examine, 
producing a reactionary core, the Solid South, at the heart of the New 
Deal liberal coalition. 
6. Social Citizenship in the Early Twentieth Century 
The Progressives. As the Populist moment passed, the movement's 
commitment to multiracial democracy - always fragile and ambivalent 
on the part of white Populists - became a dissenting tradition within 
the tradition of dissent, shunted out of the mainstream of reform ideals 
by the increasingly virulent racism of white America in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. However, the Populists' vision of economic 
justice and an alternative industrial America continued to shape main­
stream reform discourse. Progressive thinkers like Louis Brandeis and 
John Dewey carried these aspects of Gilded Age radicalism into this 
century. What the Populists and labor radicals did for agrarian and 
working class movements, Progressive thinkers like these did for their 
era's middle-class and elite reformers: they interpreted the emergence 
of big business and corporate capitalism in terms of an inherited demo­
cratic constitutionalism, and limned an alternative political economy of 
work and citizenship. Their translations of the social citizenship tradi­
tion were various, but, in general, they pushed that tradition toward a 
greater reliance on state-building, administration, and social insurance, 
while still holding out the prospect of a more democratic civil society. 
What most separated Progressives from Gilded Age radicals was the 
death of racial liberalism among white reformers. Throughout the na­
tion white Progressives concurred, or at least acquiesced without pro­
test, in the soured Tom Watson's conclusion: social reform for white 
southerners depended on black disenfranchisement and segregation. 
From the perspective of southern Progressive history, "the great race 
settlement of 1890-1910 . . . was itself the seminal 'progressive' reform of 
the era."224 The plausibility of this outlook on the national scene hinged 
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on a revaluation of Reconstruction, a new narrative, which the new so­
cial science and historical professions helped to frame. Reconstruction 
became a wildly misguided and self-regarding experiment on the part of 
Northern reform. A backward people, blacks had "suffered much but 
benefited more" under the civilizing "tutelage" of slavery. Reconstruc­
tion interrupted the civilizing process, duping the "race" with delusions 
of political grandeur beyond its reach. Former slaveholders had been 
obliged to "redeem" the South from governmental corruption and the 
madness of interracial equality. Disenfranchisement of a "backward 
people" was a grim but "necessary reform." Now the responsibility of 
Progressives was to "persuade the white masses" that benign segrega­
tion was "better than brutality."225 The gradual uplift of the "Negro" in 
"separate and special" institutions would lead him toward " 'industrial' 
efficiency" without injuring the betterment of white farmers and work­
ers.226 
To this tidily evolutionary tale, the Progressive historians added 
their "economic ihterpretation" of the Radical Republican project -
not a grand redefinition of "We, the People" but a shrewd capitalist 
scheme to clinch national policymaking for northern capital and open 
the South to northern industrial development and exploitation.227 
Thus debunked, Reconstruction could be set aside. Professor of po­
litical science at turn-of-the-century Princeton, Woodrow Wilson wrote 
in his American history textbook that the compromise of 1877 meant 
that the "supremacy of the white people was henceforth assured in the 
administration of the southern States," and the "Union was now re­
stored . . .  to normal conditions of government." With the "abandon­
ment of federal interference with elections, the 'southern question' for­
tunately lost its prominence" in national politics, to be replaced by the 
great Progressive issues of the day: "the reform of the civil service, the 
reduction of tariff duties, the control of corporations, . . .  and the purifi-
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cation of the ballot." Wilson would address these Progressive concerns 
in the White House, where, as the first southern occupant since the Civil 
War, his administration brought Jim Crow to the capital and the federal 
bureaucracy.228 
Standard accounts paint a different gulf between Progressive era re­
formers and their Gilded Age predecessors. They emphasize the Pro­
gressives' accommodation to corporate dominance, their fondness for 
managerial and administrative solutions to social problems, and their 
role in recasting American "freedom" to mean abundance and security 
in the sphere of consumption, not dignity and independence in the 
sphere of production. The Progressives' vision of reform, the story goes, 
substituted a new consumerist welfare state for the old producerist 
commonwealth. They traded the ideal of democracy for that of admini­
stration.229 
There is truth to the standard account, but its classically republican 
tale of change and decay paints over important continuities. True, the 
Progressives added state-based social provision to the rights contended 
for by the social citizenship tradition. Their administrative-state­
building ambitions were foreign to most Gilded Age reformers. But 
even the most modernizing of Progressives, like Herbert Croly, were 
engaged with the political economy of citizenship. "How," Croly re­
peatedly asked, "can the wage-earners obtain an amount or a degree of 
economic independence analogous to that upon which the pioneer 
democrat could count?" Social insurance and social legislation were 
necessary, but no substitute for transforming "the wage system itself . . .  
in the interest of an industrial self-governing democracy . . . .  " This was 
essential, in Croly's account, to "convert[ing] civil and political liberty" 
under the "old Constitution" into their "socially desirable consumma­
tion."230 
Like John Dewey, Croly's critique of the "old Constitution" ex­
tended to constitutionalism in general. Only after witnessing war-time 
repression did either find any enduring value in rights. Throughout 
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the Progressive Era, one would have searched in vain for rights talk 
on the part of these thinkers; to them rights seemed destined to ossify 
into impediments to practical change. Constitutionalism was just what 
the laissez-faire jurists insisted: a limit on the democracy's capacity to 
reconstruct its social environment by redistributive means. Yet even 
such a thorough-going anticonstitutionalist as Croly framed the case 
for reform within a constitutional narrative and interpretation of the 
founding. Indeed, he developed his theory of "Progressive Democracy" 
around the contrast and continuities between a court-dominated mode 
of constitutional self-definition and self-restraint and a more democratic 
and participatory one. 
"The American democracy," Croly argued, could accept "in the be­
ginning an inaccessible body of [judge-made] Law," and the judiciary's 
"uncontrollable" sway over the political economy, because "the Law 
promised property to all."231 This was the Constitution's "original 
promise": economic opportunity and a republic of freeholders secured 
by limited government and equal rights to own and hold property; and 
this promise made the Constitution a "working compromise" between 
the "pioneer democrat" and "the monarchy of the Law and an aristoc­
racy of the robe."232 In industrial America, however, the ideals of liberty 
and equality that were "wrought into our constitutions" no longer "con­
sist[ ed] in the specific formulation of legal and economic individualism" 
defended by the courts. Interpreting and safeguarding these constitu­
tional ideals now properly belonged to the active law making and law­
administering branches watched over by an active citizenry.233 This was 
warranted on grounds of popular sovereignty; it also had a compelling 
functional justification. Because securing the "socially desirable con­
summation" of the old liberties demanded data gathering, complex and 
necessarily fallible choices, and expert policymaking, the courts' 
authority to interpret and apply the norms of liberty and equality had to 
give way. Ending the "benevolent monarchy" of the courts was not 
chiefly a matter of institutional competence, however. For Croly, the 
main argument for a more democratic form of self-government and self­
restraint was "educational." "Have the American people been pre­
pared by the kingdom of the Law," he asked, for an "increase in popu­
lar political responsibility? Or is it just as necessary as ever to subordi­
nate the active expression of the prevailing popular will to test . . .  
applied by an aristocracy of lawyers?"234 The Framers, Croly acknowl­
edged, "were not seeking to establish a system of popular political edu­
cation." But the "monarchy of the Constitution" proved "educational 
231. CROLY, supra note 230, at 125. 
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in spite of itself."235 With "its assistance the American people have be­
come a nation." Meanwhile, the "American people were learning quite 
as much from their own unofficial experiments in democracy as they 
were from official instruction in the Word" of the law.236 They were 
"suffering," however, "from the division of purpose between their de­
mocracy and their Law," allowing the latter to substitute for any pro­
found popular regard for vision, principle, and collective self-restraint.237 
Nonetheless, broader literacy, participation in party politics and local 
self-government, and habits of "orderly procedure . . .  wrought into the 
American national consciousness" over generations, all suggested an 
"increasing political maturity."238 For "popular political education" to 
advance much further, the citizenry had to assume more of the "duty of 
thinking over their political system," their basic principles, and their 
"fundamental political problems."239 
Thus, in good Deweyan fashion, Croly argued that "[p ]rogressive 
democracy must reject the finality of [the] specific formulations" of 
"states rights" and "individual rights" offered up by the courts.240 The 
problem was not the practice of applying the ideals of constitutional lib­
erty and equality to challenged laws and institutional arrangements; that 
"would always be binding and liberating." The problem was "the sa­
credness attached to a particular method of applying the ideal."241 In­
stead, Croly evoked a more responsible and active exercise of character­
forming collective deliberation and choice, mindful of the principles that 
underpinned the courts' "specific formulations," and subject, therefore, 
to "severe limitations" on majority will, but only by dint of citizens' own 
self-reflective deliberations and self-imposed constraints.242 Whether 
the pragmatist "progressive" had the better of the legalist "conserva­
tive" in this debate was not solely a matter of empirical observation or 
reasoned argument; for the "progressive" case admittedly rested also on 
a "democratic faith."243 The faith may have been easier come by be­
cause the imagined field of action was chiefly that of economic relations 
- not civil liberties, about which Croly, like most leading Progressives, 
was largely indifferent, nor race relations, about which they nursed a 
callous and bigoted notion of evolutionary "progress." Perhaps, as 
pragmatists, some of them would not have been surprised to learn that 
235. Id. at 145-46. 
236. Id. at 146-47. 
237. Id. at 158. 
238. Id. at 144, 210-11. 
239. Id. at 150. 
240. Id. at 240. 
241. Id. at 209. 
242. Id. at 151. 
243. Id. at 199. 
56 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1 
theirs has proved a partial and one-sided view of the democratic re­
sources of rights, "higher law," and judicial authority. 
In any case, creating the conditions for the citizenry's playing an ac­
tive role in constitutional politics demanded first of all amending the 
amendment process. The "amending clause of the Constitution" was 
"unquestionably the most formidable legal obstacle in the path of pro­
gressive democratic fulfillment." Making it "much more easily worked" 
would go a long way toward converting our "semi-democratic constitu­
tionalism" into genuine "constitutional democracy."244 Then citizens 
could begin to change the constitutional text and structure to accommo­
date the active branches' role in instituting the new social meanings of 
the old liberties. 
Louis Brandeis had no use for Croly's centralizing, nationalizing 
impulses. Like Croly, Brandeis was a stem critic of the laissez-faire 
Constitution and classical legal orthodoxy, but his critique demanded an 
enlightened rather than marginalized constitutional judiciary, one that 
still enforced tempered norms of federalism and separation of powers. 
But for Brandeis too, the nation's industrial and economic orders were 
fraught with constitutional infirmities. The key object of law and 
government, Brandeis held, in good republican fashion, was sustaining a 
politically and economically independent citizenry. The Constitution 
must safeguard not only a framework of government, but also the 
project of fitting citizens for "their task" of self-rule.245 
Constitutional scholars have noted aspects of this republican vision 
in Brandeis's First Amendment jurisprudence246 and in his famous views 
on federalism.247 Less prominent in Brandeis's judicial opinions, but 
more central to his constitutional vision, was the ambitious conception 
of industrial and economic democracy forged during his career as a re­
former. No more than his grittier counterparts in the labor movement 
did Brandeis expect the courts to enact this vision, but in this era, that 
took nothing away from its constitutional moorings. Most Progressive 
reformers, even those as different as Croly and Brandeis, agreed that 
their time was one of constitutional crisis. The courts, they said, were 
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defending one constitutional order - "static," "formal," "authoritar­
ian," "aristocratical," or "monarchical" - and the reformers were 
struggling to advance another - "evolving," "experimental," "demo­
cratic."248 Today, we remember the restraint the Progressives de­
manded of the judiciary.249 And we forget the affirmative obligations 
their vision laid on the other branches of government. They sought not 
the divorce of constitutional discourse from political economy, but the 
replacement of the judiciary by "democratic" state actors as the nation's 
"authoritative" constitutional political economists.250 
With this new dispensation, all agreed, there would come an end to 
the use of common law rules and entitlements to define the substantive 
content of constitutional guarantees. Thus, in a widely published 1915 
address at Boston's Fanueil Hall, Brandeis evoked the possibility of in­
terpreting "those rights which our Constitution guarantees - the rights 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in terms of the social and 
economic conditions for their meaningful exercise in modem America. 
All Americans "must have a reasonable income" and regular employ­
ment; "they must have health and leisure," decent "working condi­
tions," and "some system of social insurance." However, the "essentials 
of American citizenship are not satisfied by supplying merely the mate­
rial needs . . .  of the worker."251 There could be no more "political de­
mocracy" in contemporary America, Brandeis told the U.S. Industrial 
Commission that same year, without "industrial democracy," without 
workers' "participating in the [business] decisions" of their firms as to 
"how the business shall be run."252 Only by bringing constitutional de­
mocracy into industry could the U.S. produce not only goods but citi­
zens.253 
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The Labor Movement in the Progressive Era and the 1920s. The 
mainstream of the early twentieth-century labor movement did not rise 
above the currents of racism that ran through middle-class Progressive 
politics. When the southern Redeemers destroyed the citizenship rights 
of black toilers, white trade unionists did not protest. Indeed, many 
unions enacted formal color bars during the decades bracketing the tum 
of the century, and by the 1900s most native-born white trade unionists 
championed immigration restrictions, against the "cheap," "servile," 
"unassimilable" southern Europeans as well as the Chinese. Along 
gender lines as well, native-born skilled white workingmen abandoned 
the broad, inclusive understanding of who belonged to the community 
of citizen workers that had characterized organized labor two decades 
earlier. The fate of this more inclusive identity was bound up with la­
bor's fortunes in the political and economic battlefields. 
The Knights of Labor expired during the 1890s; their startling suc­
cesses organizing industries across barriers of skill, race, and ethnicity 
had prompted a sustained counteroffensive by employers and employ­
ers' attorneys. From the mid-1880s onward, capital turned increasingly 
to blacklists, labor spies, private police, and the state. The nation's 
courts outlawed the Knights' and kindred unions' principle economic 
weapons. Elsewhere I have described in some detail how this constitu­
tionally enshrined judge-made law of industrial relations limited, de­
meaned, and demoralized workers' capacities for broad social and po­
litical action.254 By reinvigorating old common law limits on collective 
action and applying them to emergent forms of industrial organization 
and protest, the courts helped instill the view among skilled workers 
that inclusive, class-based unionism and the organizing tactics it entailed 
were too costly; such tactics invited brutal repression, sponsored and 
validated by the nation's high courts.255 At the same time, by invalidat­
ing hours laws and other positive measures, and turning the Anti-Trust 
Act against the very organizations that had sponsored it, the courts 
made legislation seem an unreliable, sputtering engine for industrial re­
form.256 The idea of using the ballot to transform the political economy 
Constructive Work Before the Industrial Relations Commission: A Symposium with Introduc­
tion by Paul U. Kellogg, THE SURVEY 571-88 (August 2, 1913). 
254. See FORBATII, supra note 88. 
255. Forbidding "whomsoever" from doing "whatsoever" - quitting or threatening to 
quit, meeting, singing, assembling, or encouraging others to do so - in support of a boycott or 
strike, the labor injunction was enforced by summary proceedings. The decrees encouraged 
and validated state and federal police intervention, where local authorities frequently sided 
with strikers; the decrees also legitimated the widespread use of deputized private troops. See 
id. at 59-127. 
256. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court and of most of the important state high courts 
made plain their view that the broad, positive vision of equal citizenship animating the Knights 
and the Gilded Age labor movement was flatly unconstitutional. They also made plain their 
determination to expand their powers - "magnifying, like the Apostle of old . . .  [their] office" 
in Justice Brewer's famous words - to destroy "that movement's" rival vision and secure "the 
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and the "whole social order" began to seem like tilting at windmills to 
these same skilled workers.257 So, in the wake of the bitter defeats suf­
fered by the Knights, the Homestead workers, the Pullman workers, 
and the Populists, many native-born, white working people retreated 
into insular cultures and narrower, meaner, and more defensive group 
identities and interests. 
Skilled workers remained committed trade unionists; but their 
commitments shifted to the American Federation of Labor. AFL presi­
dent Samuel Gompers propounded a "pure and simple [craft-based] 
trade unionism" that shunned the broad reform goals as well as the in­
clusive membership and identity of the Knights.258 Organized labor's 
political goals under Gompers were narrow and sharply drawn: no posi­
tive regulation, but repeal of the judge-made restraints on collective ac­
tion and an end to immigration. The social citizenship impulse hardly 
vanished among trade unionists, but it was driven out of the center pre­
cincts of labor politics until the New Deal. 
In the meantime, however, the AFL's "pure and simple trade un­
ionism" was no rejection of politics, constitutional or otherwise, and the 
AFL-led labor movement continued to cast its attacks on "industrial 
autocracy" in boldly constitutional terms. The "right of labor to have a 
voice in the industrial world" was the fundamental question of the in­
dustrial conflict, editorialized the Iron Molders' Journal. "Political 
equality is not sufficient and unless the wage-earner possesses an indus­
trial equality that places him on a par with his employer there can never 
exist that freedom and liberty of action which is necessary to the main­
tenance of a republican form of govemment."259 Workers' rights to as­
sociate, assemble, unionize, and strike constituted First, Thirteenth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims repeatedly spumed by the courts that 
labor brought again and again to Congress and state legislatures. 
The 1920s saw a burgeoning of antistrike decrees, until the propor­
tion of injunctions to the total number of strikes reached a remarkable 
salvation of the nation." David Brewer, The Nation's Safeguard, N.Y. STATE BAR AsSN., 
PROC. 39 (1893), quoted in ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 238-39 (1992). 
See generally FORBA1H, supra note 88, at 37-58 (documenting that during these decades courts 
generally struck down or vitiated the broad hours laws and other reforms at the heart of labor's 
political program). 
257. FORBA1H, supra note 88, at 37-58, 94-97. 
258. Id. at 12-19. See generally JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE PoLmcs: THE 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND PoLmCAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1917 (1998). 
259. 40 IRON MOLDERS' J. 750, 750 (1904), quoted in Harris, supra note 253, at 46-47. The 
indispensability of "industrial democracy" for a "republican form of government" was not 
an argument limited to labor journalists. At the Senate Hearings on the National Labor 
Relations Act in '34, counsel for the AFL defended the constitutionality of the Act on 
Guarantee Clause, not Commerce Clause, grounds. To Create a National Labor Board, 1934: 
Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm on Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong. 109 (1934) 
[hereinafter To Create a National Labor Board]. 
\ 
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25 percent.260 Master-servant law proved alive and well, as the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of ancient antienticement doctrines to underpin 
the widespread use of "yellow-dog" injunctions against organizing cam­
paigns.261 Amid these events, labor's advocates again brought to Con­
gress their common law arguments, constitutional claims, and stories of 
judicial repression of worker-citizens in the nation's coalfields and 
manufacturing districts. Senators like Shipstead of Minnesota echoed 
labor's constitutional outlook when he concluded at the hearings' end, 
"If they go on making human relations into property relations, the Thir­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution will be evaded, circumvented, 
and dead." Likewise, Senator Norris declared that the labor injunc­
tions' "effect has often been involuntary servitude on the part of those 
who must toil in order that they and their families may live."262 
Finally, in the '30s, Congress embraced much of labor's exiled inter­
pretations of the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 
largely outlawed the federal labor injunction, and inscribed much of the 
constitutional freedom workers claimed into federal law with the Nor­
ris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts.263 
Passed in '32, the Norris-LaGuardia Act created a thorough set of 
statutory hedges against federal labor injunctions; its preamble 
sounded some of the key themes of labor's exiled constitution.264 But 
Norris-LaGuardia did no more than prevent judicial repression of 
workers' exiled freedoms; it did nothing to protect them against em­
ployer interference and coercion. Only with the Wagner Act was the 
employer's common law authority over workers and workplace 
largely tom away. 
As we have seen, the "industrial democracy" idea was to bring 
citizenship rights into the factory and the employment relation. Histo­
rians have amply demonstrated the centrality of the idea in the out­
look and arguments of the Wagner Act's proponents.265 Witness after 
260. See FORBATH, supra note 88, at 193-98. 
261. See id. at 98-127. 
262 See id. at 160. 
263. See id. at 128-66. 
264. Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994)) 
(stating that "full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa­
tives of his own choosing" were essential to make real the liberty of contract and freedom of 
labor an individual worker was helpless to enjoy under the old regime, with its one-sided le­
gal recognition of capital's right to organize under the corporate form.). 
265. See, e.g., DAVID PLOTKE, BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ORDER: RES­
HAPING AMERICAN LIBERALISM IN THE 1930s AND 1940s (1996); Mark Barenberg, The 
Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1993); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Represen­
tation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993). On the variety of 
reform programs that marched under the "industrial democracy" banner, see Harris, supra 
note 253. 
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witness on the Act's behalf - lawmakers, labor leaders, and middle­
class reformers - cast the problem as not merely economic or social, 
but as constitutional as well. The Senate Report rang out the constitu­
tional changes. "A worker in the field of industry, like a citizen in the 
field of government," had an "inherent right" to "self-government." 
In both fields, it declared, he "ought to be free to form or join organi­
zations, to designate representatives, and to engage in concerted ac­
tivities. "266 But instead, as one local union official testified, 
"[i]ndustrially," the citizen-worker is "dis[en]franchised."267 Similarly, 
a congressman argued, self-government was an "inherent" American 
right, and "[t]his bill does no more than guarantee that right to 
American labor."268 The right of labor representation, Senator Wag­
ner later explained, was fundamental to "democratic self­
government"; in an industrial society, it marked the "difference be­
tween despotism and democracy."269 The statute's cornerstones, set 
forth in its central section, were those rights organized labor had long 
claimed under the Guarantee Clause and the First, Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments: to associ�te, organize, and act in concert, 
and to "representatives of their own choosing." 270 
The statute passed in 1935. It met with renewed organizing cam­
paigns by workers, and massive defiance by employers. Organizers 
and activists continued to be fired, beaten, and blacklisted. Where 
new unions had sprung up, employers continued to refuse recognition. 
Employers defended their defiance of the Act in the name of constitu­
tionally enshrined contract, property, and states' rights; and employ­
ers' defiance was seconded by the lower federal courts. The latter uni­
formly enjoined enforcement actions by the new National Labor 
Relations Board.271 Would workers' exiled rights prevail over the old 
Constitution in the Supreme Court? Pundits predicted not, but of 
course, events proved them wrong. 
266. S. REP. No. 1184, at 4 (1934), quoted in Becker, supra note 265, at 503. 
267. To Create a National Labor Board, supra note 259, at 51 (statement of Richard W. 
Hogue), quoted in Becker, supra note 265, at 502. 
268. 79 CONG. REC. 9691 (1935) (statement of Rep. Withrow), quoted in Becker, supra 
note 265, at 503. 
269. Senator Robert F. Wagner, Address Before the National Democratic Forum (May 
8, 1937), quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT: 
AFTER TEN YEARS 13 (Louis G. Silverberg ed., 1945). 
270. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, sec. 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994)). 
271. See RICHARD COR1NER, THE WAGNER ACT CASES (1964); PETER H. IRONS, THE 
NEW DEAL LAWYERS 244-48 (1982); Drew Hansen, The Sit-Down Strikes and the Switch in 
Time, 46 WAYNE L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2000). 
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III. THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION: THE HALF-LIFE OF THE NEW 
DEAL CONSTITUTION 
It was more than happenstance that so many of the key cases mark­
ing off the New Deal's constitutional revolution - A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.­
involved labor and labor regulation.272 They did so for the same reason 
as Lochner, the case that gave its name to the Constitution's ancien re­
gime: the common law ordering of labor-capital relations, invested with 
the permanence of fundamental law, was the social institution at the 
center of that regime. 
Beginning with the Court's attack on key New Deal measures in 
1935 and climaxing with FDR's court-packing plan and the Court's 
famous 1937 "switch in time that saved nine," by the early 1940s the 
ancien regime in constitutional law had been overthrown. Following on 
the appointments of New Deal Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Douglas, Murphy, Stone, Byrnes, Jackson, and Rutledge - several of 
them leaders of the intellectual and political battles against the old order 
- the Lochner Constitution was swept away. Entire doctrinal 
structures were cast aside and the judge-made impediments to enacting 
social citizenship and what FDR would dub the "general welfare 
Constitution" were razed. Democracy now could reach labor-capital 
relations, and Congress had no judge-made limits on its power to 
regulate the nation's economy. 
In theory, big changes in the Constitution come about by amend­
ment. Yet no amendments accompanied this sea change. Until recently 
the issue hardly mattered; no one questioned the wisdom of interring 
the Lochner regime. Now, however, many law professors say Lochner­
ism should have won. They say the New Deal changes were unjustified; 
they required but received no validating constitutional amendment.273 
These conservatives go on to argue for undoing the New Deal changes 
and resurrecting the pre-New Deal Constitution in a wide range of ar­
eas, including labor law.274 And some federal judges and Republican 
Party leaders seem to agree.275 Faced with this new crisis of legitimacy, 
272. A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Morehead v. 
New York � rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 5frl (1936); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
{1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 {1937). 
273. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231 {1994) {"The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its valida­
tion by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution."). 
274. See id.; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRNATE PROPER1Y AND TIIE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN {1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND TIIE 
CONSTITlITION {1980); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of 
the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 {1983); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper 
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 13fr7 {19fr7). 
275. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
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the New Deal Constitution has found its defenders. One theory ar­
gues that the New Dealers had merely returned to the faith of the fa­
thers.276 It was the jurisprudence of Lochner that had departed from 
precedent and tradition. But this restorationist perspective won't 
wash. As far as fidelity to the Framers is concerned, recent scholar­
ship leans heavily in favor of the ancien regime.217 
There is a second, more sophisticated defense, which Lawrence 
Lessig and Cass Sunstein describe as "translation."278 It also fails. By 
Sunstein's own account, the New Deal "refashioned the three basic 
cornerstones" of the "original Constitutional structure": (1) 
federalism - by expanding the powers of the national government to 
"something close to general police powers"; (2) checks and balances 
- by delegating "enormous policymaking power to the President and 
creat[ing] . . . powerful, autonomous executive and independent 
agencies" which combined "traditionally separated powers of 
adjudication, execution, and legislation"; and (3) individual rights -
by authorizing a "wide range of redistributive policies."279 Sunstein 
rightly sees these changes as embodying a "revolutionary redefinition 
of constitutional commitments," a "New Deal Constitution."280 Yet, at 
the same time, Sunstein sides with those who insist that the New Deal 
era saw no rupture with the constitutional past - only a "translation" 
of tradition in light of changed circumstances. He cannot have it both 
ways. True, the process of uprooting old institutional arrangements 
and creating and legitimating new ones necessitates new readings or 
"translations" of normative traditions, but it also entails collective 
choices and committed action. 
Thus, Sµnstein and Lessig are talking about politics, constitutive 
politics, and not simply "translation." Their account of New Deal 
constitutional change assumes constitutional actors besides the courts, 
but their theory puts all the burden of justification on judicial inter-
REPRESENTATIVE DICK ARMEY, THE FREEDOM REVOLUTION: THE NEW REPUBLICAN 
HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER TELLS WHY BIG GOVERNMENT FAILED, WHY FREEDOM 
WORKS, AND How WE WILL REBUILD AMERICA (1995). 
276. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free­
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1294-99 (1995). 
277. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARsHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
1835 (1991); Horwitz, supra note 7, at 57; Stephen Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and 
the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
278. See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995); Cass Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost­
Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 253-57 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit State]; 
Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987) [here­
inafter Sunstein, Constitutionalism]; Cass Sunstein, New Deals, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 
1992, at 32 (reviewing ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10). 
279. Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 278, at 423-25. 
280. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit State, supra note 278, at 253-54. 
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preters. Non-judicial actors have no interpretive authority of their 
own; their constitutive choices and actions and their extra-judicial 
"translations" of constitutional tradition play no part in Lessig and 
Sunstein's hermeneutics. And since courts may not enact such 
changes as Sunstein describes, their theory ends up papering over the 
New Deal's genuine rupture with the constitutional past and leeching 
politics, choice, and agency out of the story. 
A. The New Deal as a "Constitutional Moment" 
Putting politics, "constitutional" or "higher lawmaking politics," at 
the center of his argument lends Bruce Ackerman's defense of the New 
Deal Constitution its originality and importance. Ackerman agrees with 
today's conservatives that the New Deal transformations were signifi­
cant enough to require constitutional amendment. But he interprets the 
political processes that attended those transformations as sufficient to 
amend the Constitution. For Ackerman, the New Deal marked a "con­
stitutional moment," a sustained, self-conscious political act by the citi­
zenry that overthrows one constitutional regime and ushers in a new 
one.281 
Ackerman finds his warrant for this unconventional theory in the 
history of Reconstruction. Generalizing the Reconstruction pattern, 
Ackerman sums up the process "in terms of a simple schema: Constitu­
tional Impasse � Electoral 'Mandate' � Challenge to Dissenting Insti­
tutions � the 'Switch in Time.' "282 It is not hard to see how the schema 
applies to New Deal history. Roosevelt's first term culminated in a con­
stitutional impasse between the branches similar to that of 1866. Once 
again, the separation of powers and interbranch conflict created the 
arena for constitutional debate, enabling the conservative branch "to 
raise basic questions of legitimacy and challenge the reformers to go to 
the People if they hoped for ultimate success."283 Then, when the New 
Dealers won crushing victories in the presidential and congressional 
elections of 1936, they claimed a mandate from the People in support of 
their constitutional vision. 
Ackerman is right about the self-consciously constitutional character 
of New Deal politics and right that New Dealers claimed a constitu­
tional mandate arising from the election of '36 - or the sequence of 
elections, · '32, '34, and '36. But Ackerman is wrong - and here his 
thinking rejoins conventional wisdom - in suggesting that the New 
Deal's "constitutional mandate" amounted simply to an authorization 
281. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, 
supra note 10; Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, supra note 10. 
282. Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, supra note 10, at 79. 
283. Id. at 80. 
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for expanded federal power and an activist national government.284 Al­
though Ackerman urges us to study constitutional discourse outside the 
courts in "congressional committee reports, presidential proclamations, 
and party campaign platforms with the same care that lawyers usually 
reserve for Supreme Court opinions,"285 his own recent account based 
on extensive work with the nonjudicial texts of the New Deal era 
dodges the question of whether the New Dealers, like the Reconstruc­
tion Republicans, sought a mandate to redefine national citizenship.286 
They did, and that redefinition was their warrant for expanded powers 
and an activist national government. 
B. The "Mandate" 
In May 1935, the Court decided Schechter Poultry, striking down the 
National Recovery Act and ruling that the federal government had no 
power to regulate wages and hours in the nation's industries, save where 
the workplace was directly part of interstate commerce. In May 1936, 
Carter Coal Co. reaffirmed that "Congress is powerless to regulate any­
thing which is not commerce." Two weeks later, Tipaldo invalidated 
the New York minimum wage law for women and children, echoing the 
1923 Adkins decision: "The State is without power by any form of leg­
islation to prohibit, change or nullify contracts between employers and 
adult women workers as to the amount of wages to be paid." The 
Court's "stone wall" across the path of New Deal reform seemed com­
plete.287 
Conservative Republicans and business organizations like the Lib­
erty League hailed the Court, and as the 1936 campaign got underway, 
they repeatedly accused FDR and the New Deal of "running against" 
and "tearing down the Constitution." The Republican Platform de­
clared, "America is in peril" for FDR was "insist[ing] on the passage of 
laws that are contrary to the Constitution," "viofat[ing] the rights and 
liberties of citizens," and "constantly seeking to usurp" the rights "re­
served to the people and the States."288 Roosevelt responded in kind. 
284. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 103. 
285. Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, supra note 10, at 74. 
286. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 279-382. 
287. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936); Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 
(1936); see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, A CARING SOCIETY: THE NEW DEAL, THE WORKER, 
AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 128 (1985). 
288. See PLATFORMS OF THE TWO GREAT PARTIES, 1932-1940, at 373 (Leroy Blanton ed., 
1940). 
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1. The Language of Constitutive Politics and the Redefinition of 
Citizenship 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1936, FDR characterized the 
campaign as a moment of extraordinary popular deliberation and a time 
for basic, constitutive choices about the powers and duties of govern­
ment and citizens' legitimate claims on the state.289 
Looking back in early '37, FDR and New Dealers in Congress de­
picted their crushing victory as a "great revolution."290 The "dominant 
five-judge" "economic-social-constitutional philosophy" "was repudi­
ated by the people of America."291 The people "have overwhelmingly 
approved this [New Deal] legislation" that the "Federal courts have 
struck down."292 In these terms Hugo Black put the case for the admini­
stration's controversial court-packing plan. It was "not only the right of 
Congress under the Constitution, but the imperative duty of Congress, 
to protect the people" from the "miserable and degrading effects" of 
joblessness, exploitation and poverty.293 This was the constitutional 
philosophy FDR put before the people. The people adopted it, but, 
New Dealers lamented, the courts "have not understood . . .  this revolu­
tion."294 
In his second term's "first radio report to the people," Roosevelt 
himself put forward the constitutive-politics case for his "Plan for Reor­
ganization of the Judiciary." "I hope that you have re-read the Consti­
tution of the United States in these past few weeks," he told his millions 
of listeners. 295 Like the Protestant Bible, the Constitution was a "lay­
man's document." No priesthood or legal elite enjoyed a monopoly of 
interpretive authority. To the contrary: at critical moments in the past, 
the "lay rank and file," "the American people," and their reform­
minded "leaders" had "interpreted the Constitution for themselves" 
and set their own constitutional vision against the doctrines of the judi­
ciary and legal elite and "ultimately prevailed." They "overruled" the 
289. See e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (June 27, 1936), in 5 PuBLIC PAPERS, supra note 301, at 234 
("Never since the early days of the New England town meeting have the affairs of government 
been so widely discussed . . . .  "). In another speech, FDR described the fundamental choice be­
tween returning "to that definition of liberty under which for many years a free people were 
gradually regimented into the service [of capital]," or else embracing a "changed concept of the 
duty and responsibility of government toward economic life." ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF 
REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 10 (1995). 
290. 81 CONG. REC. 1291 (1937) (remarks of Sen. McKellar). 
291. 81 CONG. REC. App. 307 (1937) (reprinting radio address by Hon. Hugo L. Black). 
292. 81 CONG. REC. App. 639 (1937) (reprinting radio address by Hon. Hugo L. Black). 
293. See 81 CONG. REC. App. 636, 639 (1937) (address of Hon. Hugo Black). 
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295. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization 
of the Judiciary (March 9, 1937), in 6 PuBLICPAPERS, supra note 301, at 124. 
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Court. So it was today.296 
But wasn't the amendment process the proper route? No, the 
President answered. It would take years to get "substantial agreement 
upon the type and language of an amendment." Even then, "five per­
cent of the voting population" could block ratification. Moreover, the 
plutocrats, who had tried to thwart the "people's mandate in the last 
election," now aimed to make the amendment process their "last 
stand." And the Article V rules would enable them to make that proc­
ess an endlessly protracted and procrastinated one.297 
In the end, FDR and the New Dealers had to depend on neither the 
amendment process nor the court-packing plan to "save the Constitu­
tion from the Court."298 While Congress was debating the latter, the 
Court made its famous "switch in time." Soon the appointments of New 
Dealers to the Court would turn acquiescence into assent toward the 
New Deal "mandate." 
But what was the mandate's substance? Did it leave the meaning of 
citizenship untouched? Ackerman implies as much, and the result is a 
partial, truncated picture of the principles FDR and the New Dealers 
brought to the electorate for "ratification." The constitutional choices 
they laid out during the 1936 campaign were not only about lawmakers' 
authority to regulate the economy; they also involved the recognition of 
new rights and new rights-bearers. Prior to the assertion of enlarged 
governmental powers was a redefinition of national citizenship, which 
entailed those expanded powers. 
This should not surprise Ackerman. Precedent is Ackerman's 
method. To understand the deep pattern of New Deal constitutional or 
"higher lawmaking" politics, he counsels, look to Reconstruction.299 But 
of course, when the Reconstruction Republicans enlarged the powers of 
Congress and the federal government, they did so in the name of a new 
and enlarged conception of national citizenship. Sixty years later, the 
New Dealers did the same. In both moments, the new, contended-for 
rights of citizenship promised to supplant a body of law and custom that 
had codified an outcast, second-class status - the Black Codes and 
other "badges and incidents of slavery" in the first case;300 and in the 
second, the caste-ridden common law of employment and the labor 
market, and the status of millions of workers as "industrial serfs" or 
296. See also The Constitution of the United States was a Layman's Document, Not a 
Lawyer's Contract (Sept 17, 1937), in 6 PuBLIC PAPERS, supra note 301, at 363-65. For reflec­
tions on the relation between Protestant and Catholic views on interpretive authority regarding 
the scriptures and "Protestant" and "Catholic" views on authority to interpret the Constitution, 
see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL F Al1H (1988). 
297. See Roosevelt, supra note 295, at 131. 
298. Id. at 126. 
299. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 265. 
300. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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unemployed "outcasts." Seeking a mandate for a great expansion of 
national power in the face of a strong popular antistatism, it is no 
wonder New Dealers tied that expansion to popularly conceived 
precommitments in the form of social and economic rights. 
Already during the first New Deal, FDR promised a redefinition of 
the duties of government and a "re-definition of [classical liberal] rights 
in terms of a changing and growing social order."301 In the past, FDR 
explained, quoting Jefferson (and with Jefferson neglecting the black 
laboring class), America had "no paupers. The great mass of our 
population [was] of laborers . . .  [and m]ost of the laboring class pos­
sess[ed] property . . . .  "302 For this yeoman citizenry, Roosevelt ob­
served, the rights "involved in acquiring and possessing property" com­
bined with the ballot and the freedom to live by one's "own lights" to 
ensure liberty and equality.303 "The happiest of economic conditions 
made that day [of Jeffersonian individualism] long and splendid. [For 
on] the Western frontier, land was substantially free."304 The "tum of 
the tide came with the turn of the century . . . . [T]here was no more 
free land and our industrial combinations had become great uncon­
trolled and irresponsible units of power within the State."305 
"Traditionally, when a depression came a new section of land was 
opened in the West."306 Not so today; today's conditions impose new 
requirements upon Government and new meanings on old texts. A ma­
ture industrial society could not be governed by a laissez-faire Constitu­
tion, insulating industry and finance from the modern claims of liberty 
of equality. America needed an "economic constitutional order."307 
The "terms" of our basic rights "are as old as the Republic"; but new 
conditions demand new readings. "Every man has a right to life," Roo­
sevelt declared, and this means a "right to make a comfortable living." 
The "government," he went on, "formal and informal, political and 
economic, owes to everyone an avenue to possess himself of a portion 
of [the nation's wealth] sufficient for his needs, through his own 
work."308 
During the first New Deal, FDR and his allies in Congress also 
301. Franklin D. Roosevelt, New Conditions Impose New Requirement upon Government 
and Those Who Conduct Government, Campaign Address at the Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco, Calif. (Sept 23, 1932) in 1 THE PuBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 752, 753 (1938) [hereinafter PuBLICPAPERS]. 
302. Id. at 745. 
303. Id. at 746. 
304. Id. at 746 
305. Id. at 749. 
306. Id. at 746-47. 
307. Id. at 752. 
308. Id. at 754. 
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seized on the time-honored reformers' reliance on the language of the 
Preamble to undergird a positive vision of national responsibilities: 
If, as our Constitution tells us, our Federal Government was established 
among other things, "to promote the general welfare," it is our plain duty 
to provide for that security upon which welfare depends . . . [T]he security 
of the home, the security of livelihood, and the security of social insurance 
- are, it seems to me, a minimum . . .  of the promise that we can offer to 
the American people. They constitute a right which belongs to every indi­
vidual and every family willing to work.309 
Thus did FDR introduce the "general welfare Constitution" in his 1934 
address to Congress announcing the formation of the Committee on 
Economic Security. There he also continued to assimilate the new so­
cial rights to the "old and sacred possessive [traditional, constitutionally 
enshrined common law] rights" of property and labor. In preindustrial 
America, these common law rights had had rich significance for the 
"welfare and happiness" of ordinary Americans; now, only the recogni­
tion of new governmental responsibilities would enable "a return to 
values lost in the course of . . .  economic development" and "a recov­
ery" of the old rights' once robust social meaning.310 
Here again we mark FDR's increasingly pointed use of the reform­
ers' hermeneutics - the argument of changing conditions imperiling old 
principles, and new interpretations and institutional arrangements re­
storing them. Likewise, in speaking of "government, formal and infor­
mal, political and economic,'' Roosevelt and his speechwriters had em­
braced the reform tradition's pragmatist insight into the public, legally 
constructed, character of private economic power. This opened the 
space where equal citizenship norms could compel changes in the pri­
vate law rules governing market and property relations. 
2. Social Citizenship and Social Movements in Congress 
In Congress too, New Dealers echoed earlier twentieth-century 
reformers' demands that the constitutional protections of life, liberty, 
and property be interpreted, in Brandeis's words "according to the 
demands of social justice and of democracy." Thus, the Legal Realist 
Robert Hale told the Senate Committee on Education and Labor that 
the situation of an employee at a non-union steel plant was akin to that 
of a "non-voting member of a society."311 Senator Robert Wagner 
attacked the existing legal order for "perpetuating in modern 
309. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and 
Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934), in 3 PuBuc PAPERS, supra note 301, at 
291-92 (1938). 
310. Id. 
311. To Create a National Labor Board, supra note 259, at 51 (statement of Robert L. 
Hale, Professor of Law, Columbia University). 
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industry . . .  aspects of a [feudal] master-servant relationship."312 As 
citizens, workers deserved "democratic self-government," not 
"despotism" at the workplace.313 Likewise, Wagner echoed the terms in 
which organized labor had greeted the nation's many previous moments 
of mass unemployment. He called for hours laws, unemployment 
insurance, and "a long-range public-works program," decrying the 
government's role in depriving millions of citizens of the "sacred . . .  
right to earn their bread."314 
But the New Dealers' social and economic rights talk also had more 
immediate resonance: it tapped a protest language millions of industrial 
workers encountered in the groundswell of CIO organizing. The new 
industrial union organization spurned the antistatist reform vision of 
Sam Gompers' AFL. Like the Knights of Labor, the CIO's political 
identity rested on an inclusive labor movement across the boundaries of 
skill, ethnicity, gender, and race, and on the insight that bold state action 
was needed to help organize the unorganized and to answer the other 
moral and material needs of workers spurned by the AFL. So, CIO 
leaders and activists demanded affirmative government protection for 
union organizing and collective bargaining as well as government 
protection against the hazards of illness, unemployment, and old age, 
through social insurance and full employment policies. By 1936 the 
CIO, with its call for jobs, security, and industrial democracy as every 
citizen's rights, had become the organizational and financial mainstay of 
the Democratic Party in much of the country as well as the principal 
funder of FDR's reelection bid.315 
It was not only union leaders, however, but ordinary workers who 
made this social rights talk part of mass consciousness. As Lizabeth 
Cohen's work suggests, the changing experiences, attitudes, and de­
mands of ordinary workers vis-a-vis the national government lay at the 
heart of the "making of the New Deal."316 Through the 1920s the na­
tion's millions of unorganized, largely "new immigrant," factory workers 
looked on the national government with mistrust and indifference. 
Scorned by the AFL and ignored by Washington, their welfare needs 
were met, if at all, by paternalistic employers or ethnic organizations. 
National politics, like the old AFL unions, seemed largely irrelevant; by 
and large, they did not vote in national elections. Now, they were ar­
dent - and overwhelmingly Democratic - voters; they had turned 
312. Robert F. Wagner, Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
1934, § 9, at 1, quoted in Barenberg, supra note 265, at 1423. 
313. Wagner, supra note 269, at 13. 
314. 79 CONG. REC. 9283 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Robert F. Wagner). 
315. ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO, 1935-1955, at 39-40 (1995). 
316. LIZABE1H COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 
1919-1939 (1990); see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 287; IRVING N. BERNSTEIN, TuRBULENT 
YEARS: A H!STORYOFTHEAMERICANWORKER, 1933-1941 (1969). 
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away from employers and ethnic associations and looked instead to the 
national government for such basic goods as welfare, security, and em­
ployment. Mobilized by CIO locals and local activists, as they became 
the base of the New Deal Democratic Party, this American-born gen­
eration of ethnic workers and their immigrant parents transformed the 
substance of electoral politics. Experience with early New Deal pro­
grams and rhetoric engendered among these millions of working-class 
families a remarkable new sense of entitlement. They made no apolo­
gies, Cohen shows, for taking relief, social security, insurance, mort­
gages, and jobs from the state. As contributing members of society, 
they had rights to such things, and they rallied behind those politicians, 
labor leaders, and other reformers who championed expanding the pro­
grams that backed up these rights.317 
Thus, when Representative Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota de­
manded action on his plan for universal social insurance financed by 
general revenues, administration officials might complain that the Lun­
deen bill was drafted by Reds and would never pass through a commit­
tee system dominated by Southern Democrats; but they could not gain­
say the clamorous grassroots support the bill enjoyed, nor the rights 
consciousness attending it. And when Lundeen insisted that Congress 
must act on social insurance or else face mass marches on Washington 
"of people who may come here not to overthrow the Government, but 
for the purpose of demanding their rights . . . . The American people, 
all of them, are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" -
the administration did not challenge his prophecy nor his melding of old 
rights and new.318 Instead, FDR continued to make this social rights 
rhetoric his own, both responding to and encouraging workers' new 
sense of entitlement, while his administration used the evident popular­
ity of Lundeen's bill "as a 'scarecrow' to get action" on its own more 
conservative measure.319 
3. FDR Adopts the Oppositionist Narrative 
Famously "pragmatic" and frequently cautious in reform strategies, 
FDR proved constant in employing social citizenship as a language of 
ends. This public rhetoric - of which FDR and his speechwriters were 
creatures as much as creators - shapes and defines the texts to which 
Ackerman's method would have us look for the content of the "Elec-
317. See COHEN, supra note 316, at 252-83. 
318. 79 CONG. REC 6, 5968 (1935). 
319. Edmund Witte, the University ofWJSconsin labor economist who headed the staff of 
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toral Mandate" of 1936. Roosevelt's speech at the 1936 Democratic 
Convention rang in the oppositionist Constitution. FDR set out "the 
people's mandate" for new understandings of "liberty" and "equality" 
and of the citizen's legitimate claims on the state. Here was the opposi­
tionist narrative of social change and constitutional usurpation. Like 
Brandeis in the 1910s and Weaver in the 1890s, FDR told of the emer­
gence of new "royalists" and "despots," and the dangers of a new kind 
of tyranny, not political but economic: a "new industrial dictatorship" 
that had "concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control 
over other people's property, other people's money, other people's la­
bor - other people's lives." With such "concentration of control," "the 
political equality we once had won was meaningless in the face of eco­
nomic inequality." Not content with economic power, however, the 
"new economic royalty" "reached out for control over Government it­
self," and then wrapped their public and private power "in the robes of 
legal sanction. "320 
Thus, Roosevelt's constitutional narrative reached the same crisis 
and turning point as Weaver's and Brandeis's. Struggling against such 
"tyranny as this," Roosevelt proclaimed, has given "us as a people a 
new understanding of our Government and of ourselves." Our inher­
ited understandings had brought us to the brink of "economic slavery." 
Now we know, "freedom is no half-and-half affair." Political and social 
and economic citizenship were inseparable. Government has "inescap­
able obligations" to "protect the citizen in his right to work and his right 
to live," no less than "in his right to vote."321 
Repeatedly, from '36 onward, FDR and New Dealers in Congress 
spoke in terms of the nonjudicial branches' obligation to redeem the 
"new social rights" that were the "modem substance" of the old 
guarantees of constitutional liberty and equality. Always "paramount" 
was work, or what FDR's Committee on Economic Security, which 
planned the Social Security Act of '35, called "employment assurance" 
for "those able-bodied workers whom industry cannot employ at a 
given time."322 As the Social Security Act's sponsor in the Senate, 
Wagner underscored that "[a]t the very hub of social security is the right 
to have a job." Unemployment insurance was designed "not to 
supplant, but rather to supplement" the government's obligation to 
320. Roosevelt, supra note 289, at 232-34. Speaking two weeks earlier on June 12th at the 
Texas Centennial Exposition, FDR invoked the antimonopoly campaigns and constitutional 
outlook of Texas Populists and Progressives. He credited the state-based antimonopoly 
movements with stemming "the destruction of the base of our fonn of government," which was 
"the inevitable consequence" of "economic and financial control in the hands of the few." 
"For its splendid structure there would have been substituted . . . an autocratic fonn of gov­
ernment" Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at the Texas Centennial Exposition (Jun. 12, 1936), 
in 5 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 301, at 209, 212. 
321. Roosevelt, supra note 289, at 233-34. 
322. H.R. Doc. No. 81, 79 CONG. REC. 1, 546 (1935). 
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assure work for the "bulk of persons . . .  disinherited for long periods of 
time by private industry." The Social Security Act would not work 
without federal guarantees for those who could not find private 
employment.323 Roosevelt concurred. A national guarantee assuring 
the "opportunity to make a living - a living decent according to the 
standard of the time" was at the heart of the new understanding of 
liberty he had proclaimed in Philadelphia. 324 Income security for those 
who could not work, and public employment for those who could not 
find decent jobs in the private economy, had to become the "permanent 
policy [of] the federal government."325 
4. The Second Bill of Rights and the "Paramount" Right to Work 
After the legal defeat of the NIRA and the practical failure of its 
regulatory strategy for economic revival, the administration turned to 
public spending. Increasingly, FDR lent support to those in his admini­
stration, like Harry Hopkins, Harold Ickes, and Frances Perkins, who 
argued that the answer to unemployment lay in public spending tied to 
macroeconomic objectives and permanent public employment pro­
grams. Lodged in the White House, the Department of Commerce, the 
Budget Bureau, and the National Resources Planning Board, were a 
group of policymakers under the intellectual leadership of "social 
Keynesians" like Harvard's Alvin Hansen.326 They supplied not only 
legislative proposals like the Full Employment Bill of '45, but also much 
of the rhetoric and outlook animating key speeches, including the social 
and economic policy portions of FDR's 1943 and '44 State of the Union 
addresses. 
Speechwriter and editor of Roosevelt's Public Papers, Samuel 
Rosenman, has described FDR's meetings with the National Resource 
Planning Board as they formulated the Declaration of Principles for 
their important 1942 report, Security, Work, and Relief Policies. 
Roosevelt himself set about "simplifying and dramatizing" the 
Declaration for his speeches.327 The nation needed to adjust "our 
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provisions for human freedom." "[T]o the old freedoms," the Board 
declared, "we must add new freedoms and restate our objectives in 
modern terms."3 28 With the Board, the liberal wing of his party, and his 
labor backers, FDR advocated a "second, economic Bill of Rights" and 
to undergird it a reorganized federal budgeting process and an 
unequivocal federal commitment to full employment, as well as 
expanded social insurance and public investment. In addition to 
"adequate food and clothing and recreation," medical care, and "a 
decent home," Roosevelt's "Bill of Rights" included "[t]he right to a 
useful and remunerative job . . .  ; [t]he right to earn enough . . .  ; [t]he 
right of every farmer to raise and sell his products . . .  ; [t]he right of 
every businessman . . .  to trade [free from] domination by monopolies at 
home or abroad . . . [and all of these rights] regardless of . . . station, 
race, or creed."3 29 
The ALI and the Right to Work. By 1945, when Congress took up 
the administration's Full Employment Bill, the "all-important right to 
work" seemed secure, not only in labor movement and reform rhetoric 
but in the discourse of the liberal legal establishment. That year the 
American Law Institute appointed a committee of legal luminaries to 
draft a "Statement of Essential Human Rights." The staff of the Senate 
committee holding hearings on FDR's "Full Employment Bill" asked 
the members of the ALI group to prepare "an analysis of the legal and 
philosophical considerations that led to the inclusion" of the right to 
work in the ALI Statement. Their response reflects, in part, the war­
time flowering of "social Keynesianism," \vith its new practical confi­
dence in full-employment policies; it also suggests the confident footing 
that the right to work, and social rights generally, had found in the man­
darin legal culture of the day.3 0 
Liberal legal notables like these had inscribed FDR's "four free­
doms" and "second Bill of Rights" into the founding documents and 
machinery - the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, Bretton Woods ­
of the post-war international order. As they surveyed those new institu­
tions, as well as the "the [forty] nations whose current or recent consti­
tutions contain provisions granting various social and economic rights," 
and put these alongside the "fundamental legislative measures passed in 
the United States in the last dozen years . . .  to secure such rights to its 
citizens," they concluded that "the place of social and economic rights in 
328. NAT'L REsOURCES PLANNING Bo., DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL REsOURCES -
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any modem declaration of the rights of man had already been de­
cided."331 
In particular, no "modem understanding or bill of rights" could omit 
the right to work, whose popular support seemed "irresistible." Yet, 
this idea of a right, "which requires positive action by government, in­
volving complex organization and the expenditures of public funds," 
seemed to many "inconsistent with the American tradition," "pater­
nalis[tic]," potentially "tyrann[ical]," and, at the same time, "useless be­
cause it is impossible to go into court and force the government . . .  to 
insure that a man has a job."332 
The ALI draftsmen set out to respond, justifying the idea "in the 
light of these traditional habits of thought." To those who insisted on 
"the traditional legal habit of looking upon rights as negative," the ALI 
draftsmen replied with arguments that continue to run through contem­
porary debates over positive versus negative rights. They suggested that 
conceptions inherited from the "seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" 
imparted "confusion" and "rigidity to legal thinking about rights" that 
ill-served "the legislators who must implement" the Constitution. Thus, 
they pointed out that several of the rights in the Bill of Rights "actually 
require government to take very positive action indeed . . .  [entailing] all 
the involved and expensive machinery for the administration of civil and 
criminal justice . . . . In terms of mechanism and trained personnel, a 
system of social security is child's play in comparison with the system 
that gives effect to due process of law."333 
To the reproach that the right to work did not lend itself to judicial 
enforcement, they responded first that "legal invention [could] develop 
new procedures" and second that, in any case, "immediate judicial en­
forceability" was not the right test of a right. The framers afforded good 
authority that the Constitution "was equally binding" on the Congress, 
and that the latter "had the right to determine for itself the meaning of 
its provisions." "A Bill of Rights, is more than a consolidation of the 
fractions of freedom already gained . . . .  It is a directive to the whole of 
society and a guide to legislatures and executives in the framing of laws 
and regulations that will gradually make the rights effective." The rea­
son to recognize social and economic rights in a Bill of Rights is chiefly 
to erect a standard "around which public opinion can mobilize . . .  [and] 
the acts of legislatures and executives can be guided and judged."334 
331. Id. at 1248-49. 
332. Id. at 1254. 
333. Id. at 1252-53, 1255. 
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C. Jim Crow and the Half-Life of the New Deal Constitution 
1. The Dixiecrats' New Deal 
Despite his characterization of constitutional moments as occasions 
for considered popular judgments on "the rights of citizens and the 
permanent interests of the community,"335 Ackerman remains silent and 
seemingly unsure about how, if at all, the New Deal Constitution rede­
fined citizenship rights. There is a real gulf between the robust, encom­
passing rights talk of FDR's 1936 campaign, and his "second Bill of 
Rights" and the partial patchwork of entitlements that comprised the 
New Deal's actual institutional legacy - a gap between the "mandate" 
and the outcome of the New Deal "moment," for which Ackerman's 
constitutional narrative provides no explanation. But an explanation is 
at hand, if one takes a more sober look at our constitutional moments 
and the reversals and contradictions bound up with them. 
The explanation lies in what V.0. Key called the "Southern Veto": 
the hammer lock on Congress that the Southern Democrats enjoyed by 
dint of their numbers, their seniority, and their control over key commit­
tees. Key described how the Dixiecrats exercised this power to veto 
civil rights legislation - hence, the New Deal's notorious failure to en­
act a federal antilynching law.336 But the Dixiecrats used their veto 
power more broadly. Hailing from an impoverished region with a 
populist tradition, most southern Democrats were staunch supporters of 
the New Deal until the late '30s. In exchange for their support, they in­
sisted on decentralized administration and standard setting of all labor 
measures and demanded that key bills exclude the main categories of 
southern labor. Otherwise, how "were they going to get blacks to pick 
and chop cotton when Negroes were receiving [on federal work pro­
grams] more than twice as much as they had ever been paid," and when 
old-age insurance and social security bills had provisions that "would 
demoralize the region" until the southern committee heads rewrote 
them.337 
By allying with northern Republicans, or by threatening to do so, 
they stripped- all the main pieces of New Deal legislation of any design 
or provision that threatened the separate southern labor market and its 
335. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 240, 272-74. 
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distinctive melding of class and caste relations, its racial segmentation, 
and its low wages. Consider, for example, the Social Security Act. The 
Committee on Economic Security had crafted the administration's pro­
posals to propitiate the southerners. For that reason the proposals fa­
vored state-level autonomy - albeit with national minimum standards 
- in both the unemployment insurance and assistance for the needy­
aged, dependent children, and blind programs. Only the old-age bene­
fits program would be purely federal.338 But the Dixiecrats exacted 
more concessions from the congressional sponsors of the administration 
bill. National standards for unemployment and old-age insurance were 
dropped, and the administration's commitment to include all employed 
persons in the unemployment and old-age insurance schemes was sacri­
ficed. The price of Dixiecrat support included drumming out of the in­
surance programs agricultural and domestic workers - and thereby the 
majority of black Americans, who worked in these two occupations.339 
The AAA, the NRA, the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor 
Standards Acts, were all tailored in this fashion. More encompassing 
and inclusive bills, bills with national, rather than local, standards and 
administration, enjoyed solid support from the northern Democrats 
(and broad but bootless support from disenfranchised southern blacks 
and poor whites); but the southern Junkers and their "racial 
civilization" exacted a price, and FDR, willingly at first, paid up.340 This 
" 'gentleman's agreement' that held the party . . .  together appeared 
unshakable. The White House and the Dixie courthouse seemed solidly 
allied."341 However, as the new industrial unions of the CIO and the 
black voters of the North loomed large in FDR's 1936 reelection bid, 
and his social and economic rights talk grew more and more robust and 
universal, the southern attacks began. Governor Talmadge of Georgia 
convened a "Grass Roots Convention" to "uphold the Constitution" 
against "Negroes, the New Deal and . . .  Karl Marx,"342 while Senator 
Carter Glass of Virginia worried if the white South "will have spirit and 
courage enough to face the new Reconstruction era that Northern so-
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called Democrats are menacing us with."343 
The next few years brought more "interference." Minimum wage 
legislation, CIO organizing drives, rural poverty programs, and recur­
rent political initiatives and mobilizations among the disenfranchised, 
both white and black, began to undermine the political and economic 
sway of industrialists and Black Belt landowners. Although early New 
Deal programs like the AAA had been tailored by these local southern 
elites, and their powerful representatives in Congress, to pour aid into 
southern agriculture without upsetting the plantation system, the very 
inequities of these programs from tenants' and sharecroppers' perspec­
tive sparked protests and national debate. CIO organizers, NAACP 
leaders, and progressive New Deal administrators lent support to grass­
roots movements like the biracial Southern Tenant Farmers Union. 
They wheedled new programs from sympathetic New Dealers in 
Washington like Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace.344 
By the late '30s, then, roughly half of the southerners in the Senate 
voted consistently against FDR. Increasingly, roll call votes in both 
houses revealed southern Democrats joining with Republicans to op­
pose administration measures in the areas of labor reform and social in­
surance. Even more Dixiecrats "backed Roosevelt on a final vote but 
fought against his program in their respective committees, in conference 
committees, in supporting crippling amendments . . .  [and] in block[ing] 
consideration of certain [labor, health, and housing] measures."345 Then 
with the coming of War, the "gentleman's agreement" collapsed. Dur­
ing this uncertain moment of wartime labor shortages, national mobili­
zation, and rapid economic and central-state expansion, the Solid South 
redrew its lines of toleration toward New Deal reform. Southern con­
gressmen openly joined ranks with the minority-party Republicans to 
defeat those 1940s legislative programs and structural innovations and 
institutional reforms in the executive branch that looked toward "com­
pleting the New Deal" by enacting and implementing FDR's "second 
Bill of Rights."346 Thus, the Dixiecrats allied with Northern Republicans 
343. Id. at 109-110; see also WEISS, supra note 340, at 186. 
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ern Opposition to the Farm Security Administration, in THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN 
POLIDCALECONOMY83 {Robert Higgs ed., 1985). 
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to scuttle FDR's executive reorganization plan, gutted the administra­
tion's 1945 Full Employment Act, and took the lead in abolishing the 
National Resources Planning Board.347 Together, these would have laid 
an institutional foundation for active national labor market and full em­
ployment policies.348 These defeated and dismantled laws, agencies, and 
innovations would have sustained the public rhetoric and generated the 
new institutional capacities and commitments embodied in the "all­
important right to work," in the "right to useful, remunerative, regu­
lar . . . employment,"349 and "to education, for work, for citizen­
ship,"350 and ample opportunities for "training, and retraining."351 
As a consequence, we have forgotten that New Dealers uniformly 
insisted that the "right to a decent, remunerative job" was "the very hub 
of social security," and that "employment assurance" was "paramount" 
over income transfers in the original architecture of the New Deal wel­
fare state and all the major reports and proposals by New Deal cabinet 
commissions and Congressional policymakers from 1934 onward 
through 1946.352 
REsOURCES PLANNING BOARD 283-332 (1981); Katznelson et al., supra note 340. 
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2. "A New Reconstruction Era": The Contours ofa Labor-Based 
Civil Rights Movement 
Between the popular ratification of the New Deal vision of social 
citizenship and its enactment into law stood Jim Crow. The New Deal 
era saw an effort to oust him, a labor-based civil rights movement that 
linked the struggles for racial justice and social citizenship. Thus, Sena­
tor Glass of Virginia was not wrong. In the late '30s and early '40s a 
"new Reconstruction" did menace the South. The Great Migration of 
African Americans from the rural South to the industrial cities of the 
North, which began during World War I, laid the foundation. By the 
late '30s the black vote was "important and sometimes decisive" in 
scores of northern congressional districts;353 and black workers had be­
come a significant part of the nation's industrial work force.354 With the 
birth of the CIO, a new national labor organization once more wel­
comed black workers. In the 1880s, African Americans had been a 
small part of the nation's industrial workforce and so a small fraction of 
the Knights of Labor's constituency; but in the 1930s black workers 
were central to union organizing throughout the nation - in southern 
metal and coal mining, longshore, and tobacco manufacturing, as well as 
in northern auto, steel, and meatpacking. "Equal rights for Negro 
workers" was a defining demand of the new CIO, and friend and foe 
alike agreed that the new industrial unions would not have prevailed 
without the militant support they won from black workers.355 One 
canny observer of New Deal politics concluded that the CI O's battle for 
black rights became a vital symbol of the CIO's fight for equality for all 
Americans - especially in the minds of the first-generation offspring of 
southern European immigrants.356 Nor was this identification by "new 
immigrant" workers with equal rights for black workers only symbolic; 
in contrast to its parents and its children, the 1930s-40s generation of 
working-class "white ethnics" often proved ready to elect black shop 
stewards and union presidents.357 
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Meanwhile, the traditional leaders of the cause of racial equality 
found the CIO an alarming upstart. From Detroit and Chicago to 
Winston-Salem and Birmingham, NAACP newsletters and board 
meetings bristled with misgivings about the "new crowd" of black union 
activists and their demands for a "more militant civil rights program."358 
The NAACP, with its litigation and social work orientation and its mid­
dle-class leadership, seemed ill equipped to act in the workplaces and in 
working-class neighborhoods where black Americans fought their most 
decisive battles in the New Deal era. Instead, the half million black 
workers who joined CIO unions thrust themselves into the vanguard of 
civil rights struggles. As a study by one of the NAACP's chief founda­
tion funders uneasily concluded, "the characteristic movements among 
Negroes are now for the first time becoming proletarian . . .  ";359 and a 
reporter for Crisis, the NAACP's national journal, observed that the 
CIO had become a "lamp of democracy" throughout the old Confeder­
ate states. "The South has not known such a force since the historic 
Union Leagues in the great days of the Reconstruction era."360 
This movement gained much of its dynamism from the creative ten­
sion that arose between unionized black workers and the federal gov­
ernment - a relationship that Lichtenstein and Korstad compare to the 
one between the church-based civil rights movement and the national 
government two decades later.361 Brown v. Board legitimated the pro­
test movement and sit-ins of the early '60s, and the latter, in turn, lent 
political force and urgency to Brown's dormant promise of racial equal­
ity. In like manner, the rise of inclusive industrial unions and the pas­
sage of New Deal labor legislation provided working-class blacks a new 
standard to legitimate grass roots civil rights protest and demands for re­
form. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act excluded agricultural 
workers to accommodate Jim Crow, and it contained no explicit antidis­
crimination provision for the same reason.362 Nonetheless, the "one 
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man, one vote" policy implemented in thousands of National Labor 
Relations Board elections enfranchised black industrial workers who 
never before had voted or participated as rights-bearers in the public 
sphere. The new unions, in turn, offered black workers industrial citi­
zenship - participating in union governance, deliberating and deciding 
upon workplace grievances and broader goals; and these experiences 
combined with the patriotic egalitarianism of the New Dealers' war­
time propaganda to generate a militant rights-conseiousness among 
black workers as powerful as that evoked by the Baptist spirituality of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. a generation later.363 
This was manifest in the labor-led voting rights movement across the 
South, and in the leading black trade unionist A. Philip Randolph's un­
ion-sponsored "March on Washington for Jobs and Equal Participation 
in National Defense."364 In 1941, Randolph called on "Negro America" 
to march on the capital: "[I]f American democracy will not give jobs to 
its toilers because of race or color . . .  it is a hollow mockery."365 FDR 
responded by creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee 
(FEPC), which promised to end job discrimination in defense industries. 
The first civil rights beachhead in the federal government since the 
Freedmen's Bureau, the FEPC was a weak agency; but its interracial 
staff conducted well-publicized hearings and investigations, exposing 
racist conditions and spurring on black protest.366 Beginning in 1943, 
Randolph addressed rallies demanding a permanent FEPC to be or­
ganized "roughly like the NLRB" with similar authority to identify and 
adjudicate "violations of rights" and "go to court if necessary." Like the 
National Labor Relations Act, this law would secure "the right to work 
without demeaning discrimination." The one protected the "dignity of 
union membership and industrial democracy"; the other would protect 
the "dignity of fair employment."367 Bills to transform the war-time 
FEPC into a permanent federal agency came before Congress in 1945, 
the same year that it took up the administration's Full Employment Act. 
Both were cast as measures to enact FDR's "second Bill of Rights." 
The social "right to work" and the civil right to "seek work without dis-
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crimination"368 were two sides of the same equation - both of them 
parts of the "economic rights of American citizenship," which, begin­
ning in the early '40s, FDR always declared were vested "regardless of 
race and color."369 A year later, the Dixiecrats defeated the civil right to 
work with filibusters and the social right to work by gutting the admini­
stration's bill in committee.370 
The defeat of these two core rights was no surprise to sober New 
Dealers. Eight years had passed since the Solid South first stopped the 
New Deal's legislative engine in its tracks, and important nationally 
based institutions and reformers had begun to assail the Solid South, re­
alizing that the future of New Deal reform hinged on confronting Jim 
Crow. 
In the summer of 1938, Roosevelt intervened in several primary 
elections in the South, hoping to defeat some of the most prominent re­
actionary Democrats. For the first time he openly attacked the South's 
congressional leadership for thwarting legislation that would reform the 
South's "low-wage economy" and its "feudal economic system." The 
president met with success in "woo[ing] southern labor and tenant 
farmers into the camp of his new liberalism," one of his southern foes 
observed. Nonetheless, the effort to unseat these foes was doomed by 
the fact that the white primary, the poll tax, and other restrictions kept 
most blacks and a majority of low-income whites, the "new liberalism's" 
constituency, in other words, from voting.371 
If it did not stop the conservative Democrats, FDR's campaign to 
elect southern liberals helped galvanize the labor-based civil rights 
movement. The 1938 primaries led to the founding of the Southern 
Conference on Human Welfare (SCHW), a biracial coalition organized 
by southern trade unionists and civil rights activists and funded by the 
CIO to attack disenfranchisement and complete the liberal realignment 
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of the Democratic Party.372 Virginia Durr, a leader of the antipoll tax 
movement, wrote Eleanor Roosevelt, "[t]he whole Southern bloc is 
blocking us at every tum. They realize it is the beginning of their end. 
Thank God for that happy day."373 
But Durr's happy day did not arrive, not in time to oust the 
"Southern bloc" and complete the New Deal's unfinished reforms. To 
be sure, by 1944, many New Dealers agreed with Vice President Henry 
Wallace's assessment that completing the New Deal demanded 
overturning Jim Crow. That year the Supreme Court decided Smith v. 
Allwright,314 declaring the all-white primary unconstitutional; this 
combined with an outpouring of money and black and white organizers 
by the CIO to produce an extraordinary voter registration drive in the 
South. In a few southern states like Alabama and Georgia, the number 
of black and poor white voters increased several fold.375 At a rally in 
Birmingham, a black leader recalled those "first bright days of 
Reconstruction [when] the legislatures controlled by the newly freed 
slaves and the emancipated poor whites gave to our region its first 
democratic governments." It was time, he said, for "history to repeat 
itself. "376 
That too was not to be. The fraud, intimidation, and violence that 
greeted the SCHW and the southern movement to revive the demo­
cratic promise of Reconstruction confirmed once more how dependent 
such a regional movement ultimately was on a national commitment to 
decisive action based on a broad interpretation of constitutionally pro­
tected civil and political rights. Presented with such a federal commit­
ment, even in the late 1930s or early '40s, perhaps a majority of hard-hit 
white southerners would have proved willing to forsake old political 
identities rooted in states' rights and white supremacy, and wager once 
more on the promised boon of social citizenship wedded to racial jus­
tice. But states' rights and white supremacy remained too deeply etched 
in the national government and party system from which such a com-
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mitment would have had to emerge. 
The constitutional bad faith that for half a century enabled both par­
ties and all three branches of the federal government to condone or 
support Jim Crow and disenfranchisement, produced the anomaly of a 
reactionary core at the heart of FDR's New Deal liberal coalition. This 
excluded most of black America from the benefits of the main New 
Deal programs.377 This same constitutional bad faith at black America's 
expense also deprived all Americans of the institutional foundations and 
ideological legacy of social citizenship. Broad social and economic 
rights talk fell into disuse after the decisive defeats the New Deal 
agenda suffered in the 1940s. Blocked by the Dixiecrats at every legisla­
tive crossroad, the CIO, social citizenship's only powerful, organized 
constituency, gradually abandoned its efforts to "complete the New 
Deal." By the mid-'50s the industrial unions had begun instead to 
fashion with employers a private system of social provision and job secu­
rity through collective bargaining in core sectors of the economy.378 
During the same moment, the rigid consensus politics of the Cold War 
eclipsed the confident liberalism of New Deal America. 
IV. THE CMLRIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE "NEGROES' NEW DEAL" 
Beginning with the Montgomery bus boycott in '56 and culminating 
in the epic confrontation in Birmingham, the wave of sit-ins, demonstra­
tions, and near-riots that swept the South and the nation in spring and 
summer '63, the civil rights movement opened the door to reform for 
the first time since the '30s. Today, after thirty more years and a "civil 
rights revolution," blacks remain disproportionately at the bottom of 
the nation's increasingly unequal class structure: black unemployment 
remains more than twice that of whites. "All too many . . .  black peo­
ple . . .  are more deeply mired in poverty and despair than they were 
377. More than that, it produced a system of social provision that would remain split along 
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during the 'separate but equal' era."379 Critical race theorists find it 
"amazing in retrospect . . . how very little actual social change was 
imagined to be required by 'the civil rights revolution.' "380 In fact, most 
of the leaders of that "revolution" were keenly aware of the profound 
changes their vision of equality entailed in respect of America's class 
structure and political economy. We have forgotten how many black 
leaders and white policymakers of the civil rights era consciously set out 
to complete the New Deal moment, convinced that without social citi­
zenship for all Americans, many, perhaps most, black Americans would 
remain part of a subordinate caste. Bayard Rustin was a lieutenant of 
A. Phillip Randolph during Randolph's 1941 March on Washington 
campaign and chief organizer of the 1963 March on Washington. In 
1964 he warned the Democratic National Convention that the "solution 
to our full citizenship" demanded more than "the Civil Rights Bill."381 
"What will [the Negro] gain by being permitted to move to an inte­
grated neighborhood if he cannot afford to do so because he is unem­
ployed . . . [W]hat advantage is it to the Negro to establish that he 
can . . .  go into any establishment open to the public," if "he is bound to 
[an economic] servitude?"382 
It was "essential" but insufficient "to outlaw discrimination in em­
ployment when there are not enough [jobs] to go around." Civil rights, 
he told Congress the year before, "are built on" "the right to a decent 
livelihood," or they rest on sand.383 Indeed, "it would be dangerous and 
misleading to call for [enforcement of antidiscrimination norms] without 
at the same time calling attention to the declining number of employ­
ment opportunities in many fields.''384 And Rustin detailed the "dis­
placement of lesser and unskilled workers" in the nation's "relatively 
high-wage heavy industries into which Negroes have moved since World 
War I" and the vast numbers of black workers cast aside each year by 
the "diminishing number of [decently paid unskilled and semi-skilled] 
jobs.''385 Nor was displacement "confined to the cities,'' he went on, 
noting that "[m]echanization of agriculture" in the past decade meant 
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that "as the great city minorities feel the pressures of increasing unem­
ployment and poverty themselves, their numbers may be swelled by 
other unskilled workers from the country."386 "We cannot have fair 
employment," he warned, "until we have full employment."387 
This same insight drove Martin Luther King to launch the Poor 
People's Campaign. The "full emancipation and equality of Negroes 
and the poor," he repeatedly told rallies and demonstrations, legislative 
hearings and White House conferences, demanded a "contemporary so­
cial and economic Bill of Rights." King's "Bill," like FDR's, empha­
sized decent incomes, education, housing, and full employment.388 
The initiative that fleshed out King's "Bill" was the Freedom Budget 
for All Americans. Its prompting came from the November 1965 White 
House Civil Rights Conference, where King, Randolph, and others 
underscored the inadequacy of the administration's antipoverty 
programs: they provided job counseling but no jobs; they targeted black 
ghettoes as a kind of riot control and fostered the "mischievous" notion 
that "the War on Poverty is solely to aid the colored poor."389 Instead, 
King and Randolph proposed a "Freedom Budget," a "multi-billion 
dollar social investment to destroy the racial ghettoes of America, 
decently house both the black and white poor, and to create full and fair 
employment in the process."390 Randolph compared the idea to the 
"social investments of the New Deal," noting that the New Deal's labor 
legislation and public investments did more than provide jobs and foster 
collective bargaining; they "evoked a new psychology of citizenship, a 
new militance and sense of dignity" among white workers, and so would 
the Freedom Budget "among millions of Negroes." It would be "their 
New Deal thirty years late."391 
386. Id at 5. Increasingly, then, where Negroes find work at all, they find themselves "to an 
unusually high degree concentrated in poverty jobs: domestics, the janitorial occupations in the 
service trades, laundry workers, etc. These are people who often labor a full two thousand 
hours a year and who are, nevertheless, bitterly poor." Bayard Rustin, Freedom Budget Arti­
cle, n.d., in Rustin Papers, supra note 381, Reel 13, at 5. 
387. Rustin, supra note 383, at 7. 
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389. Rustin Papers, supra note 381, at 27. 
390. Bayard Rustin, Untitled Article on the Freedom Budget, in Rustin Papers, supra note 
381, Reel 13, at 1. 
391. Id. at 9. When Randolph and King enlisted Leon Keyserling to lead a group of AFL­
CIO, Department of Labor, and academic economists charged with drafting a detailed pro-
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The same genre of full employment policies was pressed on Con­
gress and the President by Walter Reuther and the industrial union 
wing of the AFL-CI0.392 More strikingly, these policies found bold 
champions among the New Dealers in the Kennedy and Johnson ad­
ministrations, above all in Johnson's Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz. 
Wirtz and others waged a sustained battle against the "partial and 
piecemeal" social services/work counseling approach being adopted by 
the War on Poverty. Eloquent in his carefully documented accounts of 
the "human slag heap"393 emerging in the nation's industrial regions, in­
cluding its central cities where black unemployment already had begun 
to "explode," Wirtz, like the drafters of the Freedom Budget, urged in­
stead regional and sectoral public investment, other incentives for job 
creation, and coordinated employment services and training.394 
But the Wirtz/Freedom Budget approach got nowhere. Most 
contemporaries explained its failure in terms of the escalating costs of 
waging the Vietnam War and LBJ's desire for a cheap, quick fix for 
ghetto unrest. The impediments, however, were deeper. Committing 
the Democrats to the kind of political economy King now demanded 
would require mobilization and coalition-building on a much vaster 
scale. It required a palpable threat of mass protest on the part of the 
poor and working class, black and white - a felt crisis of govemability 
- sufficient to compel LBJ and the Democrats to act and to give them 
the kind of strategic mobility and leverage over business that FDR 
enjoyed in the '30s; otherwise, structural economic reforms simply could 
not pass. 
But such a conjuncture was not in the cards. Reuther and other 
progressive labor leaders supported King's vision - but not the AFL­
CIO leadership under George Meaney's wing, and not Reuther's own 
constituents. The latter, as Meaney pointedly observed, cared about the 
pensions, health plans, and job security measures in their union con­
tracts, not about raising hell until government provided these things for 
gram, they assured the project's continuities with the New Deal, for Keyserling had been a 
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everyone. Ironically, Reuther's own accomplishments had helped en­
sure that organized labor's grievances now came in more administrable 
packages.395 The defeats social citizenship suffered in the '40s, when the 
whole CIO demanded it, and the "private welfare state" that its unions 
created in the '50s and '60s, meant tqat now the language of social and 
economic rights no longer resonated for organized workers. 
CONCLUSION 
So black America never got its "New Deal thirty years late." Nor 
did white working-class America get the New Deal Constitution it was 
promised thirty years earlier. The reasons are many, but the central 
ones trace back to DuBois's "unending tragedy of Reconstruction" and 
the tangled knot of race and class. From the perspective of this history, 
the New Deal constitutional legacy that is under unprecedented attack 
today is a marred one. We have enshrined the vast expansion of na­
tional governmental power, but not what it was expanded for. This sug­
gests why Ackerman's theory might explain how constitutional politics 
authorized the New Deal Justices to hand down their transformative 
opinions, but it cannot readily show how the "rights of citizens" were 
transformed by the New Deal moment. Matters would be different if 
the only fault line were the exclusion of blacks from a newly enacted na­
tional commitment to social citizenship. But as we have seen, the be­
trayal of Reconstruction had more pervasive consequences. It sub­
verted white America's capacity to enact even a racially exclusionary 
form of social citizenship. Accordingly, there is no "synthesis" of racial 
equality and social rights to be drawn here; the fault lines are too many. 
Thus, Ackerman points to "the Full Employment Act of 1946" as a 
"framework statuteO" that was "part of a 'New Deal Constitution' " 
that the people had forged.396 But as we have seen, "We" hollowed out 
the constitutional substance of that statute. Ackerman gets the law's ac­
tual title wrong; it was the "Employment Act of 1946," reflecting the 
removal of the new federal right and the institutional and policy innova­
tions proposed in the "Full Employment Bill of 1945." What possible 
precommitment could one draw from the '46 Act to constrain the "or­
dinary politics" of today? In general, the commitments "We" made to 
ourselves in the New Deal moment were too deeply compromised by 
our past inconstancy to undergird the kind of "preservative" theory 
Ackerman desires. 
My constitutional narrative offers the colder comfort of a deeper 
395. See BOYLE, supra note 392; LICHrENSTEIN, supra note 355. Nor was Reuther's racial 
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understanding of the most embattled dimensions of liberal constitu­
tional theory. The historical knot of race and class has tied liberal con­
stitutional theory to a conception of the affirmative dimensions of con­
stitutional equality that does not fit the moral and historical arguments 
meant to support it. Those arguments call for a broader conception -
as did the New Dealers and the Civil Rights leaders we canvassed. The 
twice-told defeat of social citizenship prevented this. Synthesizing the 
majoritarian and countermajoritarian ideals of equal citizenship remains 
a task for future movements and a future moment; no theorist can re­
claim such a synthesis from our flawed past. , 
But perhaps this history also yields a constitutional imperative. If so, 
it is a much weaker one that only binds us in the arena of public dis­
course and debate. If the narrative outlined here proves persuasive, and 
we can agree that the question of social citizenship was concluded by 
the shadow of Jim Crow on the nation's polity, then perhaps we can 
agree it was concluded illegitimately and must be reopened. If we do 
reopen the question, we may find that a conception of social citizenship 
centered on a decent livelihood is not only better grounded in our his­
tory, but also more appealing as a normative matter. A right to welfare 
is insufficient to underpin the equal respect on which equal citizenship 
rests. Equality of worth, not in dollars but in the sense of having an op­
portunity to earn one's livelihood, is essential. 
It is no longer seriously disputed that the nation is witnessing a dra­
matic decline of decent jobs with decent pay. While newly created jobs 
burgeon in many parts of the country, most of these pay the minimum 
wage, and most recipients of that wage are not raising families, and for 
good reason: even after the increase recently enacted by Congress, a 
minimum wage will not bring a family of three up to the poverty line. 
Estimates vary, but even today in one reasonable reckoning, as many as 
one-third of the American work force is looking for more work than 
they now have, while the poverty rate for full-time workers has been in­
creasing - a 50% increase from 1980 to today. And both trends seem 
very likely to mount.397 The split society - riven by harsh class ine­
quality - is not coming; it is here. 
Broadening "the base of citizenship by broadening the base of 
work" is no simple task, and the capacity of government to do so is con­
strained in many ways.398 Plainly, however, many ill-paid jobs could be 
decently paid. Meeting unmet public needs could generate many new 
jobs. Our understanding of the kinds of toil and contributions to the 
common good that count as compensable "work" could be enlarged. 
And countless demeaning workplaces could benefit materially as well as 
morally from a measure of democracy. This is not the place for policy 
397. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 41, at 11-12. 
398. See Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work, supra note 39, at 560. 
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discussion, but policy must take account of what this history suggests. 
There are constitutional stakes in the present "crisis of work"399 - and 
in its consequences in second-class citizenship, where caste and class in­
tersect for millions of Americans. 
399. See id. 
